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INTRODUCTION 
Although New York Times v. Sullivan1 purported to shield the press 
from liability in defamation suits brought by public officers,2 juries 
have found for plaintiffs in more than half of the cases decided under 
the actual malice standard.3  Damages in those cases often amount to 
millions of dollars,4 and many of the judgments are founded on 
dubious evidence of actual malice.5  Accordingly, four decades after 
the Supreme Court handed down the landmark decision, scholars 
have disparaged Sullivan for imposing its own chilling effect on the 
press through massive awards and increased litigation costs.6 
The actual malice standard has also been criticized for 
inadequately protecting the reputations of plaintiffs.7  Victims of 
defamatory news reports are immediately placed in defensive 
                                                 
 1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 2. See id. at 278–80 (establishing the rule that publications shall not be subject 
to liability for defamation absent a showing of actual malice, under the reasoning 
that any lesser standard exposing publications to greater liability would effectively 
restrict the press’ freedom and the public’s freedom to access information). 
 3. MEDIA LAW RESEARCH CENTER, MLRC 2004 REPORT ON TRIALS AND DAMAGES, 
MLRC BULLETIN 63, tbl. 5 (Feb. 2004). 
 4. See id. at 28, tbl. 8 (reporting that the average award in libel suits is more than 
$2.25 million).  Note that the tables do not account for settlements and cases that 
otherwise did not make it to trial.  In this sense, they are incomplete, but the point 
remains that damages in cases involving the actual malice standard can, and often 
do, reach startling amounts.  See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware:  The 
Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1983) (providing an 
overview of the growth of mega-awards in defamation suits against media 
defendants). 
 5. See generally Brian C. Murchison et al., Sullivan’s Paradox:  The Emergence of 
Judicial Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 7, 95 (1994) (discussing the use of 
circumstantial evidence by trial courts in contravention of Sullivan). 
 6. See infra notes 120–123 (describing the restrictive effect of large jury awards 
and litigation costs on media defendants and freedom of the press). 
 7. See infra Part I.B. 
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postures and cannot shield themselves from public scorn.8  When 
those plaintiffs are denied their day in court, they have little recourse 
to reclaim their good names.  To make matters worse, reputational 
injuries seem inevitable following Sullivan because the actual malice 
standard does not deter the press from negligently investigating leads 
and reviewing stories.9  Indeed, Sullivan incentivizes practices that 
increase the likelihood that the press will publish injurious 
falsehoods.10 
But hope is not lost for the actual malice standard.  Sullivan should 
be rescued rather than replaced, albeit in an unconventional 
manner.  This Article proposes to reform libel litigation by creating a 
summary proceeding through which media defendants can shield 
themselves from liability by proving that they complied with a 
baseline standard of responsible journalism.  The proposed standard 
would eliminate the chilling effect on the press by substantially 
reducing both litigation costs and the likelihood of damage awards.  
For victims of defamation, the proposed standard would prevent 
reputational injuries by deterring negligent reporting and providing 
defamed individuals with outlets for counterspeech.  Most 
importantly, the proposed standard would safeguard the 
fundamental constitutional interests driving the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in libel cases by ensuring that public debate is founded 
on information that has been thoroughly investigated and fact-
checked.11 
Part I of this Article briefly examines Sullivan and the progression 
of modern libel law.  Part II discusses the tripartite failures of the 
actual malice standard that necessitate its reform.  Part III argues that 
the First Amendment requires that the Supreme Court restructure 
the constitutional regime of defamation law to promote a baseline 
standard of journalistic professionalism.  Finally, Part IV proposes the 
creation of a summary proceeding that both resolves the three 
failures of the actual malice standard and furthers the constitutional 
                                                 
 8. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1971) 
(elaborating on the notion that the public is far more attentive to the defamation of 
a prominent individual than to any subsequent denial of the substance of the 
defamation, and so counterspeech is an inadequate recourse for defamed 
individuals). 
 9. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964) (acknowledging 
that the New York Times engaged in negligent behavior, but still not holding the 
newspaper liable for those negligent practices). 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. h (1977) 
(contrasting the important interest in informing the public on serious matters with 
the far less important interest in spreading gossip). 
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mandate for a responsible press.12  This Article concludes by 
addressing potential objections to the proposed summary 
proceeding. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT DEFAMATION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Until its landmark holding in Sullivan, the Supreme Court’s 
construction of the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment 
aligned closely to early English common law.13  Under that 
conception of the First Amendment, the government was proscribed 
from imposing prior restraints on libels, while subsequent 
punishment of false speech was permitted.14  Accordingly, in a series 
of decisions throughout the early twentieth century, the Court 
repeatedly held that the First Amendment does not protect the press 
from defamation liability.  The two most notable decisions in this line 
were Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire15 and Beauharnais v. Illinois.16  In 
Chaplinsky, the Court famously created a two-tier conception of the 
First Amendment, holding, 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
                                                 
 12. See Smolla, supra note 4, at 84 (pointing out the diminished social utility of 
speech when its veracity is questionable). 
 13. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714–15 (1931) (affirming that the 
First Amendment prohibits prior restraints of the press, but refusing to decide 
whether it also prohibits subsequent punishment). 
 14. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *152 (discussing the elimination 
of the British ex ante licensing requirement, and stating that “where blasphemous, 
immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels are punished by 
the English law . . . the liberty of the press, properly understood, is by no means 
infringed or violated”).  It is unclear whether the Framers intended the protections 
of the First Amendment to extend beyond those recognized under English common 
law.  The version of the press clause first proposed by James Madison that provided 
that “the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be 
inviolable,” was substantially curtailed to its current form.  See Leonard Levy, The 
Legacy Reexamined, 37 STAN. L. REV. 767, 790 n.107 (1985) (citing James Madison’s 
June 8, 1789 proposal).  Outside of this small amount of legislative history, there is 
no evidence that the first Congress debated the scope of the First Amendment’s 
protection of the press.  See id. at 767 (“[E]ven if the amendment had a broader 
reach, the ‘freedom of the press’ it originally protected was freedom from licensing, 
censorship, and other forms of prior restraint.”); see also David A. Anderson, The 
Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 475-80 (1983) (discussing the division 
between the early Federalists and the Madisonians regarding the breadth of the First 
Amendment following the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798); Gerald A. Berlin, 
Reviews, 72 YALE L.J. 631, 631-38 (1963) (commenting on LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY 
OF SUPPRESSION (1960), and arguing that Professor Levy failed to fully account for the 
opposition of early colonists to the imposition of ex post punishment for seditious 
libel following the trial of John Peter Zenger). 
 15. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 16. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
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thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include the 
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury 
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.  It has been 
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.17 
In Beauharnais, the Court reaffirmed Chaplinsky and held that libel is 
not “within the area of constitutionally protected speech.”18 
Sullivan marked a radical shift from the view propounded in 
Chaplinsky and Beauharnais, as it was the first case in which the Court 
held that the First Amendment grants limited protection from 
subsequent liability for the publication of defamatory statements.19  At 
issue in Sullivan was a one-page political advertisement placed in the 
New York Times (“the Times”) that contained false statements 
regarding police treatment of African Americans in Montgomery, 
Alabama.20  The respondent, L. B. Sullivan, was an elected 
commissioner in Montgomery whose duties included oversight of the 
city’s police department.21  Although Sullivan was not named in the 
advertisement, he argued that the false statements implicitly referred 
to his office and thereby defamed him through his supervisory role.22 
                                                 
 17. 315 U.S. at 571–72.  The Court in Chaplinsky also noted its holding in Near 
and stated that “[t]he protection of the First Amendment . . . is not limited to the 
Blackstonian idea that freedom of the press means only freedom from restraint prior 
to publication.”  Id. at 572 n.3.  Interestingly, the Court failed to explain how its view 
of libel as falling outside the scope of the First Amendment did not render prior 
restraints of defamatory speech constitutionally permissible. 
 18. 343 U.S. at 266.  While the Supreme Court in Sullivan overruled Chaplinsky 
insofar as it extended First Amendment protection to libelous speech, Chaplinsky 
survived in theory.  As the Court noted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 
(1974), false statements of fact have “no constitutional value” and fall under the 
umbrella of unprotected speech discussed in Chaplinsky. 
 19. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 291-92 (1964). 
 20. Id. at 256–58. 
 21. Id. at 256. 
 22. Sullivan pointed to two paragraphs of the advertisement in particular.  The 
third paragraph stated: 
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang ‘My Country, ‘Tis of Thee’ on 
the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and 
truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama 
State College Campus.  When the entire student body protested to state 
authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an 
attempt to starve them into submission. 
Id. at 257.  As the Court noted, Montgomery police were not present at the 
demonstration.  Moreover, the students were expelled not for the protest, but for 
demanding service of the lunch counter at the local county church.  The campus 
dining hall was not padlocked.  Id. at 259. 
 Sullivan also highlighted the advertisement’s sixth paragraph, which alleged, 
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Both before and after the Times published the advertisement, its 
employees engaged in questionable journalistic practices.23  No 
employee of the Times attempted to fact-check the information in the 
advertisement, despite the existence of Times articles discussing some 
of the events described in the advertisement, and the presence of at 
least one Times “stringer” reporter in Alabama.24  The manager of 
Advertisement Accountability at the Times approved the 
advertisement for publication because its text was subscribed with the 
names of sixty-four prominent political, religious, and cultural 
leaders—all of whom the manager believed were credible.25  None of 
the individuals, however, authorized the use of their name, nor were 
any made aware of the advertisement prior to its publication.26  The 
Times advertising editors failed to contact any of the advertisement’s 
supposed sponsors to confirm that they had consented to be 
signatories.27  Sullivan notified the Times of the false statements 
shortly after they were published, but its editors refused to publish a 
retraction because they did not believe that the statements about 
Montgomery police officers’ conduct implicated Sullivan’s 
                                                 
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King’s peaceful 
protests with intimidation and violence.  They have bombed his home almost 
killing his wife and child.  They have assaulted his person.  They have 
arrested him seven times⎯for “speeding,” “loitering” and similar “offenses.”  
And now they have charged him with “perjury”⎯a felony under which they 
could imprison him for ten years. 
Id. at 257-58.  Sullivan argued that the use of the term “they” regarding the seven 
arrests referred to conduct by Montgomery police officers, and that the other uses of 
“they” therefore also imputed police misconduct.  Id. at 258.  Regarding this 
paragraph, the Court noted that Dr. King was arrested four times, and that the 
alleged assault was denied by one of the accused police officers.  Id. at 259. 
It was uncontroverted at trial that some of the statements in those paragraphs were 
false.  Id. at 258. 
 23. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 50-51 (Ala. 1962) (noting that 
despite the newspaper’s own finding from an internal investigation that there was no 
truth to the allegations in the advertisement, the Times refused to publish a 
retraction until forced), rev’d, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  According to the Supreme Court 
of Alabama, “[i]n the face of this cavalier ignoring of the falsity of the advertisement, 
the jury could not have but been impressed with the bad faith of The Times, and its 
maliciousness inferable therefrom.”  Id. at 51. 
 24. Id. at 46; see id. at 29 (explaining that the term “stringer” typically refers to an 
on-site news correspondent employed by another news agency, who is occasionally 
asked for reports). 
 25. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 261.  The signatories included Eleanor Roosevelt, Harry 
Belafonte, Marlon Brando, Nat King Cole, Sammy Davis, Jr., and Shelley Winters.  
Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at L25, available at 
http://1stam.umn.edu/a 
rchive/primary/sullivan.pdf. 
 26. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 260. 
 27. Id. 
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reputation.28  Eventually, the Times published a retraction after 
receiving a complaint from the Governor of Alabama.29 
Following a trial in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, a jury 
awarded Sullivan $500,000 in presumed and punitive damages, which 
was the exact amount he sought.30  The Alabama Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment, holding that the statements referred to 
Sullivan and were libelous per se.31  The state high court, however, 
devoted little of its attention to the First Amendment and primarily 
discussed procedural issues.32 
On certiorari, Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the Supreme 
Court, which unanimously reversed the decision of the state high 
court.33  The Court noted that it could have reversed solely on the 
narrow ground that the references to the police in the advertisement 
were insufficient to establish a cause of action for the defamation of 
an unnamed county commissioner.34  Nevertheless, the Court instead 
reversed on the novel ground that absent a showing that the 
defamatory speech was uttered with actual malice, the First 
Amendment prohibits a public official from recovering for allegedly 
defamatory statements relating to his official conduct.35  To establish 
actual malice, the public official must prove with “convincing clarity” 
that the speaker uttered the statement with knowledge of its 
falsehood or with reckless disregard of its veracity.36 
The Court was primarily concerned that liability for defamation 
would deter the press from reporting on political matters.37  Justice 
Brennan noted that civil liability imposes a greater chilling effect on 
the media than prosecution for seditious libel, as civil defendants face 
the possibility of massive damages.38  Also, because civil defendants 
lack protection from double jeopardy, they may face multiple lawsuits 
for a single libelous statement.39  Public officials could thereby impose 
“virtually unlimited” damages on journalists in addition to the costs of 
                                                 
 28. Id. at 257, 261–62. 
 29. Id. at 261–62. 
 30. Id. at 256. 
 31. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 49-51 (Ala. 1962) (adopting the 
rationale of Johnson Publ’g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441 (Ala. 1960)), rev’d, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964). 
 32. Id. at 30-39. 
 33. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292. 
 34. Id. at 264–65. 
 35. See id. at 269 (noting that “libel can claim no talismanic immunity from 
constitutional limitations”). 
 36. Id. at 285-86. 
 37. Id. at 297 (Black, J., concurring). 
 38. Id. at 277 (majority opinion). 
 39. Id. at 278. 
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litigating multiple lawsuits, such that they could keep the press from 
publishing materials critical of the government.40  Thus, the Court 
held that the Constitution tolerates the dissemination of some false 
statements to ensure unfettered press coverage of political matters.41 
The Court also moved libel law into the scope of the First 
Amendment to prevent courts motivated by local biases from 
imposing liability on the press.42  Although they did not discuss it in 
Sullivan, Justice Brennan and his peers were aware of evidence 
indicating that the trial of the Times was tainted with racism, as well as 
anger over the intrusion of a northern newspaper into local southern 
affairs.43  Despite the judgment of the state trial court, Sullivan’s 
reputation was probably not substantially injured by the 
advertisement.44  In fact, Sullivan remained popular in Montgomery, 
and many Montgomery residents were outraged by the 
advertisement.45  Moreover, the Court was concerned that the 
availability of damages for libel threatened the financial viability of 
newspapers.46  By the time the case was decided, the Times faced five 
other defamation suits in Alabama, with liability potentially as high as 
                                                 
 40. Id. at 278-79. 
 41. See id. at 271–72 (“[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . 
it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ 
that they ‘need to survive.’” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 42. See id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring) (“Montgomery is one of the localities in 
which widespread hostility to desegregation has been manifested.  This hostility has 
sometimes extended itself to persons who favor desegregation, particularly to so-
called ‘outside agitators,’ a term which can be made to fit papers like the Times, 
which is published in New York.”). 
 43. See W. WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE:  TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER TIMES V. 
SULLIVAN 14-15 (1989); see also Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s Brief in Opposition 
at 3, N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 609) (arguing that racial bias 
and community pressures led to violations of due process in the state courts); Harry 
Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case:  A Note on The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 200 (1964) (observing that Alabama took 
advantage of its opportunity to draw attention to the Times’ participation in the civil 
rights movement in the South). 
 44. See HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 17 (noting Sullivan’s own testimony that he did 
not suffer any loss in compensation or face the threat of termination). 
 45. See id. at 12–14 (detailing the testimony of six witnesses, all of whom stated 
that they did not believe the advertisement was true, and even if it was, they thought 
no less of Sullivan because of it); see also ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION:  
LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 1.2.2 (2006) (pointing out that several 
other libel suits were brought against the Times by state and local officials, such that 
outsiders were punished for expression of unpopular views despite no apparent 
harm to the public officials’ reputations). 
 46. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 294 (Black, J., concurring) (“The half-million-dollar 
verdict does give dramatic proof, however, that state libel laws threaten the very 
existence of an American press virile enough to publish unpopular views on public 
affairs and bold enough to criticize the conduct of public officials.”). 
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$2 million in addition to the cost of litigating the cases hundreds of 
miles from New York.47 
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court held that the evidence 
offered at trial was insufficient to support a finding that the Times’ 
published the advertisement with actual malice.48  Justice Brennan 
first held that the Times’ advertising manager held a good faith and 
reasonable belief that the advertisement was “substantially true,” and 
he therefore did not maliciously approve of the advertisement’s 
publication.49  The newspaper’s failure to check the accuracy of the 
statements against its own stories or contact any of the 
advertisement’s signatories was insufficient to show that the Times 
reporters and editors knew the statements were false or acted with 
reckless disregard of its veracity.50  Likewise, the Court held that the 
newspaper’s failure to retract the advertisement could not serve as 
retroactive evidence of malice.51  At most, the facts supported a 
finding of “negligence in failing to discover the misstatements,” 
which is “constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness that is 
required for a finding of actual malice.”52 
From the outset of its holding in Sullivan, the Court was divided as 
to the extent to which the First Amendment protects libelous 
statements.  Indeed, although Sullivan was a unanimous decision, 
only six justices supported the actual malice standard.  Justices Black, 
Goldberg, and Douglas rejected the standard, arguing instead that 
the Constitution should provide absolute protection for speech about 
public officials.53  In his concurrence, Justice Black argued, 
‘Malice,’ even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract 
concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove. The requirement that 
malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the 
right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not 
                                                 
 47. Id. at 278 n.18 (majority opinion). 
 48. Id. at 287–88. 
 49. See id. at 286 (refusing to adopt the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion 
that malice could be inferred from the fact that the advertising manager ignored the 
falsity of the advertisement). 
 50. The Court, however, held that the actual malice standard would be satisfied if 
those stories were brought to the attention of the Times employees responsible for 
the publication of the advertisement.  Id. at 287. 
 51. Id. at 286–87. 
 52. Id. at 287–88.  Professor Richard Epstein argued that this holding 
represented the Supreme Court’s attempt to strike a balance between absolute 
protection for the press (i.e., a no-liability standard), and strict liability for the 
publication of injurious falsehoods.  Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. 
Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 801-02 (1986) in THE COST OF LIBEL:  
ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 137–47 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 
1989). 
 53. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293–305 (Black, J., concurring). 
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measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First 
Amendment.54 
Moreover, he stated that determining liability remained at the whim 
of potentially biased factfinders, such that government officials were 
still capable of harassing the press.55  Justice Goldberg separately 
argued that the actual malice standard would lead to juror confusion, 
and that the right to speak about public matters should be 
independent of “a probing by the jury of the motivation of the citizen 
or press.”56 
In the decade that followed Sullivan, the Supreme Court further 
developed the actual malice standard in a series of fractured 
decisions.57  Among the first matters addressed by the Court was 
whether the actual malice standard sufficiently accommodates the 
interest in protecting plaintiffs’ reputations, and whether that interest 
is constitutional or state-held.58  The Court came closest to 
recognizing a constitutional right to reputation in a concurrence by 
Justice Stewart in Rosenblatt v. Baer,59 in which he famously argued, 
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from 
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our 
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human 
being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty.  The protection of private personality, like the protection of 
life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments.  But this does not mean that the right is 
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our 
constitutional system.60 
A year later, Justice Harlan wrote for a plurality of the Court that the 
First Amendment protection of speech must be balanced against the 
“pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks on 
reputation.”61 
                                                 
 54. Id. at 293. 
 55. See id. at 294–95 (noting that invidious motivations to harass the press are not 
limited to racial bias). 
 56. Id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 57. See infra notes 58-62. 
 58. See Smolla, supra note 4, at 33-35 (discussing the Court’s open invitation in 
Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) for states to develop a suitable 
standard of liability in defamation suits because it would be unwise for the Court to 
balance constitutional claims of the press against reputational claims of plaintiffs on 
an ad hoc basis). 
 59. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
 60. Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 61. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 146–47 (1967) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 (majority opinion)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Despite these statements, the Court held in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc.62 that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting plaintiffs’ 
reputations, but that the actual malice standard does not necessarily 
interfere with that interest.  Writing for the Court, Justice Powell 
agreed that the First Amendment requires a balancing between two 
competing interests:  the state interest in protecting plaintiffs’ 
reputations and the press’ constitutional interest in immunity from 
liability.63  Gertz held that the Sullivan standard accommodates those 
interests by limiting the protection of the press to statements made 
about public officials and figures.64 
Justice Powell offered two arguments that the interest in the 
reputations of both public officials and figures are accommodated by 
the actual malice standard.  First, individuals who enter the public 
limelight are subject to public scrutiny and thus, assume the risk of 
being the targets of defamatory statements.65  Second, prominent 
individuals can use their publicity to issue counterspeech and thereby 
rectify the injury caused by false statements.66  Noting that the “first 
remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—using available 
opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error,” the Court 
held that private citizens are at a substantial disadvantage in 
remedying injuries to their reputation than are individuals in the 
public eye.67  For that reason, the actual malice standard was limited 
in application to suits brought by public officials or figures.68 
II. THE TRIPARTITE FAILURES OF THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD 
Just after the Supreme Court decided Sullivan, scholars praised the 
decision, in the words of Alexander Meiklejohn, as “an occasion for 
dancing in the streets.”69  Yet as courts struggled to apply the actual 
malice standard, its theoretical and practical flaws were quickly 
revealed.  In the four decades after Sullivan, criticisms of the decision 
                                                 
 62. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 63. See id. at 343, 347-48 (drawing a compromise between the state interest in 
protecting the reputations of its citizens and the interest in protecting the press from 
the dangers of a strict liability standard for defamation). 
 64. See id. at 345 (reasoning that an assumption of self-exposure to the media on 
the part of public figures distinguishes public from private individuals in the 
protections from defamation they are afforded). 
 65. Id. at 344. 
 66. Id. at 345. 
 67. Id. at 344.  The Court failed, however, to address why the imperative of using 
self-help should cut off all liability from public figures instead of merely mitigating 
damages. 
 68. Id. at 352. 
 69. Kalven, supra note 43, at 221 n.125 (internal quotation omitted). 
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have been both varied and pervasive.70  Indeed, most articles on libel 
law call for its reformation, and many scholars have gone so far as to 
advocate the wholesale elimination of the actual malice standard.71 
This Part will discuss three particular arguments against the actual 
malice standard that underscore the need for reform.  The first 
argument is that the actual malice standard overprotects speech by 
encouraging irresponsible media practices.  The second argument is 
that the standard, particularly as discussed in Gertz, underprotects the 
reputations of plaintiffs.  The final argument, and perhaps the most 
common criticism of Sullivan, is that the standard underprotects 
speech because it fails to shield the press from the tremendous cost 
of litigating libel suits.  These three criticisms, taken together, raise 
serious concerns about the efficacy of the actual malice standard in 
satisfying the First Amendment interests that compelled the Court in 
Sullivan to protect defamatory speech. 
A. The Actual Malice Standard Overprotects Speech 
The actual malice standard necessarily implicates the issue of 
journalistic responsibility by failing to penalize journalists who 
negligently publish defamatory statements.  Given the Court’s 
concern for the chilling effect of widely available damages72 and 
especially considering the local biases that affected the case,73 it is 
understandable that the Court in Sullivan refused to allow the Times 
to be held liable for its negligent conduct.74  Nevertheless, in seeking 
                                                 
 70. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 71. Interestingly, two types of arguments call for overturning Sullivan:  those that 
claim that the First Amendment does not protect defamatory speech and those that 
claim that it provides absolute protection for political speech by the press.  Compare 
Paul A. Lebel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation:  An Accommodation of the Competing 
Interests Within the Current Constitutional Framework, 66 NEB. L. REV. 249, 287-97 (1987) 
(arguing that the press can be adequately protected through non-constitutional 
reformation of defamation law, and that the press should have absolute protection 
for speech concerning the government), and Kalven, supra note 43, at 221 n.125 
(agreeing with Alexander Meiklejohn’s characterization of the Sullivan decision as 
cause for celebration because of increased protection of the press with regard to 
political speech), with David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. 
REV. 487, 550 (1991) (concluding that the “present law of libel is a failure”), and 
David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel:  A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REV. 
847, 847 (1986) (declaring that “[w]e face a libel crisis”), and Epstein, supra note 52, 
at 783 (criticizing the characterization of the Sullivan decision as a cause for 
celebration). 
 72. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (noting that the 
judgment awarded was one thousand times greater than the maximum criminal 
penalty). 
 73. See id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring) (mentioning that there was widespread 
hostility toward desegregation in Montgomery, Alabama). 
 74. See id. at 264 (majority opinion) (reversing the $500,000 judgment against 
the Times). 
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to avoid that chilling effect, the Court freed the Times from any 
liability for its negligent conduct, which included the newspaper’s 
failure to fact-check the advertisement, contact any of its signatories, 
or publish a timely retraction once it discovered that the 
advertisement contained false statements.75  Flawed as pre-Sullivan 
libel law may have been, widely available damages in libel suits 
provided journalists with a strong incentive to get the story right.  By 
looking solely to journalists’ states-of-mind, however, the only 
incentive provided by the actual malice standard is that they report 
with clean consciences, regardless of whether they act reasonably or 
comply with professional norms.76 
In addition to the failure of Sullivan to deter negligent media 
conduct, the actual malice standard specifically encourages certain 
irresponsible practices.77  The Sullivan standard provides reporters 
with a strong disincentive from investigating news stories beyond the 
minimum necessary.  The more a reporter investigates, the more 
likely it is that the reporter will discover some information that casts 
the veracity of the story into doubt, which would increase the 
likelihood of liability.78  Simply failing to fully investigate a story, 
                                                 
 75. See supra notes 22-28 (detailing the negligent conduct of the Times).  Note, 
however, that an incentive remains to publish truthful statements insofar as plaintiffs 
will attempt to prove falsehood in order to recover damages.  See Philip L. Judy, The 
First Amendment Watchdog has a Flea Problem, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 541, 549 (1997) 
(remarking that this burden of proof protects the media when it reports accurately).  
Note also that plaintiffs may be able to indirectly hold media defendants liable for 
negligent conduct by introducing evidence of such conduct as circumstantial 
evidence.  See generally Murchison, supra note 5, at 12 (mentioning that circumstantial 
evidence of journalistic behavior may be used by plaintiffs to prove a reporter’s state 
of mind). 
 76. One of the first sources of this criticism came neither from academic 
scholarship nor from the United States.  In 1991, the British Supreme Court 
Procedure Committee considered whether England should adopt the actual malice 
standard.  In its report, the committee rejected Sullivan and rebuked American law 
for overprotecting “irresponsible” media conduct.  The report stated, “Standards of 
care and accuracy in the press are, in our view, not such as to give any confidence 
that a Sullivan defense would be treated responsibly.  It would mean, in effect, that 
newspapers could publish more or less what they like, provided they were honest.”  
[BRITISH] SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE COMMITTEE REPORT ON PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE IN DEFAMATION 164–65 (1991); see Anderson, supra note 71, at 516 
(“Under [Sullivan], constitutional protection turns not on what is published, or on 
the objective truth or falsity of what is published, but on defendants’ knowledge or 
doubts with respect to falsity.”). 
 77. See, e.g., William P. Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, The First 
Amendment, and Bad Journalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 185 (“The actual malice 
standard not only holds that there is no need to investigate; it suggests that it often is 
better not to investigate.”); see also Judy, supra note 75, at 555 (“There is no better way 
to avoid knowledge of the truth than to avoid investigation.”). 
 78. See Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 186 (observing that although 
thoroughly investigated stories are most useful to the news-reading public, they are 
also the riskiest because investigating thoroughly increases the risk that a paper will 
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however, constitutes mere negligence for which the reporter cannot 
be held liable.79  Similarly, editors are discouraged from extensively 
reviewing stories, checking the facts contained in them or 
recommending that a reporter conduct additional investigation, as 
any of these actions may be seen by a jury as evidence that the editor 
“entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication.”80 
Perhaps the most powerful incentive of irresponsible journalism 
stems from the invasive discovery available to libel plaintiffs.  For 
example, the Supreme Court in Herbert v. Lando81 ruled that the 
“thought processes” of reporters and editors are open to discovery in 
defamation suits.82  Likewise, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,83 the Court 
allowed the admission of evidence obtained from a search into a 
newspaper’s offices and files.84  These holdings discourage reporters 
and editors from revealing their doubts as to the accuracy of a story 
and generally encourage a lack of communication between them.85  
Moreover, the liberal discovery rules in libel suits deter reporters and 
editors from keeping written records such as notes that can later be 
used against them.86 
The actual malice standard encourages irresponsible journalistic 
practices in two other important respects.  While the media may be 
held liable for repeating the defamatory statements of others, the 
                                                 
be found to have acted with actual malice); see also Judy, supra note 75, at 555–59 
(noting that a reporter cannot be held liable for relying solely on one source, but the 
reporter can be held liable for seeking out multiple sources, one of whom casts 
serious doubts on the story’s veracity). 
 79. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974). (holding that a 
reporter must act with a “high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity” to 
establish reckless disregard for the truth). 
 80. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); see Judy, supra note 75, at 
553–54 (describing the “no verification rule,” in which an editor and reporter refrain 
from communicating with each other because they fear that such communication 
will be used as evidence of actual malice). 
 81. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
 82. See id. at 191-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It would be anomalous to turn 
substantive liability on a journalist’s subjective attitude and at the same time to shield 
from disclosure the most direct evidence of that attitude.”). 
 83. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
 84. Id. at 563-67 (dismissing the argument that searches of newspaper offices for 
evidence will seriously threaten the ability of the press to gather, analyze, and 
disseminate news).  Although that case concerned a police search for evidence in a 
separate criminal case, Justice Stevens noted in dissent that the interests at stake in 
Zurcher paralleled those in a defamation suit.  Id. at 580-81 n.8 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 85. See Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 183–84 (arguing that sound journalism 
is undermined when editors are discouraged from communicating with reporters 
about their work product). 
 86. See Judy, supra note 75, at 554 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, allowing searches of reporters’ offices and files, prompted 
reporters to avoid keeping written records). 
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Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Pape87 held that the press cannot be 
held liable for publishing false statements made by the government.88  
That rule, however, encourages the media to heavily rely on public 
officials as sources, and provides no incentive to check information 
provided by the government.89  Moreover, the actual malice standard 
encourages the press to repeat news stories that have already 
attracted the public’s attention.  Because the individuals at the focus 
of those stories are more likely to be deemed public figures, reporters 
have greater assurance that the First Amendment will protect those 
statements, whereas no similar guarantee exists in reporting a story 
that has received little coverage elsewhere.90 
B.  The Actual Malice Standard Underprotects Reputation 
As noted in Part I, the Court in Gertz held that the actual malice 
standard accommodates the reputational interests of public officials 
and figures (“public plaintiffs”).91  First, Justice Powell argued that by 
voluntarily entering public controversies or taking on public roles, 
public plaintiffs know that they will face increased scrutiny and 
therefore assume the risk of being defamed.92  Second, Justice Powell 
argued that public plaintiffs can mitigate the reputational harm 
inflicted upon them by using their publicity to engage in 
counterspeech.93  Both claims, however, are severely flawed.94 
                                                 
 87. 401 U.S. 279 (1971). 
 88. See id. at 292 (holding that a newspaper did not act with reckless disregard for 
the truth when it omitted the word “alleged” from an article citing a government 
report on police brutality); see also Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 
6, 13-15 (1970) (holding that a newspaper was not liable for speech that accurately 
reflected statements made at an official city council meeting). 
 89. See Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 189–92 (noting that the Pape rule 
essentially allows the government to set the media’s news agenda).  In his concurring 
opinion in N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, Justice Black declared that “paramount 
among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the 
government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die 
of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.”  403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., 
concurring).  To the extent that the Supreme Court has encouraged the press to 
cease examining government speech with a critical eye, the actual malice standard 
promotes a breach of journalists’ central duty. 
 90. See Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 192–93 (suggesting that Supreme 
Court jurisprudence may encourage reporters to “jump on the bandwagon and be 
protected, [rather than] report on a new issue and risk liability”). 
 91. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974). 
 92. Id. at 344-45 (arguing that individuals must accept certain consequences of 
their involvement in public affairs). 
 93. Id. at 344. 
 94. See, e.g., Judy, supra note 75, at 584 (questioning Justice Powell’s reasoning on 
the grounds that a public plaintiff may not have assumed the risk of being defamed, 
and also might lack the capability to adequately combat false statements). 
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The actual malice standard forecloses nearly all access to damages 
for public plaintiffs, yet public plaintiffs do not have equal access to 
effective counterspeech, nor do they equally assume the risks 
attendant to media scrutiny.  For example, the extensive list of public 
officials identified in post-Sullivan libel actions includes police 
officers,95 professors at public universities,96 private nursing homes 
licensed by states,97 and probation officers.98  These individuals or 
entities have less access to public counterspeech and assume the risk 
of defamation to a reduced degree than major public officials like the 
President or federal legislators.  Nevertheless, the actual malice 
standard treats them in exactly the same manner.99  Stated otherwise, 
the problem is that the ability of public plaintiffs to anticipate and 
mitigate reputational harm varies depending on the prominence of 
the plaintiff, yet the actual malice standard almost entirely cuts off 
liability to them as though their ability to do either was on equal 
footing.100  Moreover, public officers such as policemen are no better 
at foreseeing or redressing reputational harm than private citizens, 
yet the latter group is far more likely to receive damages for libel.101 
Accordingly, public plaintiffs may not be able to issue 
counterspeech that can reach the same audience—quantitatively or 
qualitatively—as major media outlets.  Sullivan is an apt example of 
this problem.  Because the Times was a prominent newspaper, to the 
extent that the advertisement at the heart of the case actually 
                                                 
 95. E.g., Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable, Inc., 780 F.2d 340, 342 (3d 
Cir. 1985); McKinley v. Baden, 777 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 96. See, e.g., Grossman v. Smart, 807 F. Supp. 1404, 1408 (C.D. Ill. 1992) 
(granting summary judgment to the defendants because the two plaintiff professors 
failed to show that the defendants acted with actual malice). 
 97. See, e.g., Doctor’s Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. E. Shore Newspapers, Inc., 244 
N.E.2d 373, 377-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (ruling that the plaintiff’s nursing home was a 
public official for the purposes of Sullivan analysis). 
 98. E.g., Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. 1991). 
 99. See, e.g., id. (requiring a public official plaintiff to prove actual malice). 
 100. In Gertz’s defense, Justice Powell recognized the disadvantages of creating a 
broad standard as opposed to purely deciding libel cases on a case-by-case basis.  The 
Court upheld the actual malice standard, however, because a case-by-case evaluation 
of defamation claims would lead to “unpredictable results and uncertain 
expectations” and would hamstring the Court’s ability to supervise lower courts.  
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974).  This argument is somewhat 
unsatisfying, however.  While the need for a broad standard is clear, the fact remains 
that some plaintiffs deemed public officials have virtually no access to public 
counterspeech, nor can it realistically be said that they invited media scrutiny.  
However, note that this objection does not apply as easily to public figures.  Because 
their status as public figures turns in part on the extent to which they voluntarily 
enter a public controversy, they should be able to foresee scrutiny concerning that 
controversy and issue counterspeech to reporters seeking comment from them. 
 101. Cf. Judy, supra note 75, at 584 (positing that private figures, such as actors or 
athletes do not necessarily assume the risk of defamation by rising to the top of their 
professions). 
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referred to Sullivan, its statements about him were published on a 
wide stage.  But because the Court recognized that the actual malice 
standard does not require newspapers to retract false statements,102 
Sullivan’s ability to issue counterspeech on a national stage was 
limited to the willingness of the Times or another prominent 
newspaper to publish his reply.  Absent that circumstance, Sullivan 
could not resort to self-help.  Moreover, as a county commissioner, 
Sullivan assumed the risk of defamation at most from the local press.  
It is far less tenable that he also assumed the risk of being defamed in 
the national press. 
A further problem is that the Internet has provided avenues of 
communication that can reach considerably larger audiences than 
those available when Gertz was decided.103  Sullivan and Gertz were 
concerned with a world where only an exclusive few newspapers or 
broadcasters could publish information broadly to the public.104  
Today, however, the media has expanded to include web logs 
(“blogs”), online news and opinion publications, and message 
boards.105  The potential damage inflicted by defamatory Internet 
speech is substantially magnified, as Internet publications are open to 
a global audience and available for a longer, sometimes permanent 
duration.106  Whereas only 394 copies of the Times were circulated in 
Alabama at the time of Sullivan, access to Times articles is now solely 
limited by an individual’s ability to use a computer or get to a 
newsstand.107 
The prevalence of Internet speech undermines the viability of 
Justice Powell’s claims.  It is arguable that a public officer invites the 
scrutiny of traditional news outlets, which are run by professional 
journalists and are businesses that prize their reputations for 
                                                 
 102. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286-87 (1964). 
 103. See, e.g., Miniwatts Marketing Group, World Internet Usage Statistics News 
and Population Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (reporting that 
almost 1.2 billion people have access to the internet) (last visited Aug. 25, 2007). 
 104. See Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech:  A New 
Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 833, 848–54 (2006) (arguing that the 
Court in Sullivan and Gertz was concerned with a “one-to-many” media archetype, but 
that the Internet has shifted the media archetype to a “many-to-many” model). 
 105. See id. (noting that today the average citizen enjoys a potential global 
audience on the Internet through the use of web sites, blogs, and Usenets). 
 106. A recent article in The Washington Post aptly highlighted this problem.  
According to the article, law students’ summer jobs are put at risk because of the 
availability of postings on an online message board notorious for spreading malicious 
rumors.  See Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 
2007, at A1 (reporting that gossip about law students was posted on Internet chat 
threads, which became widely accessible though Google searches). 
 107. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 260 n.3 (noting that total circulation for the Times 
that day was 650,000). 
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accuracy.108  However, most public officers do not assume the risk of 
being defamed by an anonymous blogger or in a message board 
posting.  More importantly, the expansion of outlets for mass 
communication has diluted the effectiveness of public plaintiffs’ 
counterspeech.109  While a large portion of the media is likely to cover 
statements made by a public plaintiff of major prominence, such as a 
senator or movie star, counterspeech made by many, if not most, 
other public plaintiffs will reach a smaller and less concentrated 
audience.110 
In response to the problem of unequal access to counterspeech, it 
has been suggested that the Court replace the public plaintiff 
categories with one that turns on a plaintiff’s “relative access” to 
counterspeech.111  However, this response does not resolve a further 
problem with Justice Powell’s arguments, which he briefly discussed 
in Gertz:  that “an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo 
[the] harm of defamatory falsehood” because “the truth rarely 
catches up with a lie.”112  That is, once a defamatory statement has 
been published, the defamed individual is immediately placed in a 
defensive posture and is therefore at a disadvantage in curing the 
reputational harm.113 
                                                 
 108. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974) (“An 
individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary 
consequences of that involvement in public affairs.  He runs the risk of closer public 
scrutiny than might otherwise be the case.”), with Judy, supra note 75, at 584 
(questioning whether private citizens who achieve the status of public figures truly 
assume the risk associated with their fame). 
 109. See Owen Fiss, In Search of a New Paradigm, 104 YALE L.J. 1613, 1614–15 (1995) 
(arguing that the expansion of the media requires the Court to consider the 
implications of the “technological revolution” on the First Amendment); 
Perzanowski, supra note 104, at 853 (discussing the effect of the Internet in 
disbursing publications to a more scattered audience). 
 110. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (questioning whether news 
outlets give “[d]enials, retractions, and corrections” enough prominence to 
counteract the harm inflicted by the original story). 
 111. See Perzanowski, supra note 104, at 860–71 (advocating that courts should 
only apply the actual malice standard where the plaintiff’s access to corrective 
counterspeech is sufficient to protect their reputational interests). 
 112. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9 (majority opinion). 
 113. This argument was eloquently made by Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1971): 
[I]t is the rare case where the denial overtakes the original charge.  Denials, 
retractions and corrections are not “hot” news, and rarely receive the 
prominence of the original story.  When the public official or public figure is 
a minor functionary, or has left the position that put him in the public 
eye . . . the argument loses all of its force.  In the vast majority of libels 
involving public officials or public figures, the ability to respond through the 
media will depend on the same complex factor on which the ability of a 
private individual depends:  the unpredictable event of the media’s 
continuing interest in the story.  Thus the unproved, and highly improbable, 
generalization that an as yet undefined class of “public figures” involved in 
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Despite recognizing this problem, Justice Powell asserted that the 
availability of counterspeech satisfies the public plaintiff’s 
reputational interest regardless of the adequacy of the 
counterspeech.114  This response is unsatisfying.  Justice Powell 
premised the public/private distinction in large part on public 
plaintiffs’ ability to mitigate reputational harm through 
counterspeech.115  Yet almost immediately thereafter, he recognized 
that counterspeech is “seldom” effective in achieving that very end.116  
In other words, his argument is that a public plaintiff’s reputation 
does not warrant special protection because that plaintiff can resort 
to self-help that is almost always inadequate. 
In arguing that counterspeech is constitutionally sufficient 
regardless of its potency, Justice Powell implied that ineffective 
counterspeech is an inevitable consequence of any rule that protects 
press speech.  There are, however, two scenarios in which a public 
plaintiff’s counterspeech can be considerably more effective in 
rebutting false statements than the counterspeech envisioned by 
Justice Powell.  First, counterspeech can be contemporaneous with 
the defamatory utterance when reporters seek and publish responses 
from would-be plaintiffs.  Second, where the press retracts false 
statements, the public counterspeech comes not from the plaintiff, 
but from a more reliable speaker—the source of the false statement.  
A retraction is also more likely to reach the same audience as the 
defamatory statement, as a public plaintiff’s counterspeech would 
otherwise be made in a different outlet with a different audience.  
Consequently, counterspeech would be bolstered by a rule requiring 
or encouraging the press to publish concurrent responses and 
subsequent retractions. 
C. The Actual Malice Standard Underprotects Speech 
The third criticism of the actual malice standard, which is made 
throughout much of the literature on libel law, is that the standard 
fails to shield the press from the chilling effect feared by the Court.117  
                                                 
matters of public concern will be better able to respond through the media 
than private individuals also involved in such matters seems too insubstantial 
a reed on which to rest a constitutional distinction. 
 114. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9 (“But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal, 
standing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to our 
inquiry.”). 
 115. Id. at 344. 
 116. Id. at 344 n.9. 
 117. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 71, at 514 (noting that plaintiffs are likely to 
ask for, and juries are likely to award, punitive damages in defamation cases); Barrett, 
supra note 71, at 856 (“Juries may well perceive . . . that they are charged with 
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Ironically, Sullivan had the effect of substantially increasing the cost 
of litigating libel cases by expanding the scope of discovery needed by 
plaintiffs.118  The Sullivan standard turns on the defendant’s state-of-
mind, thus requiring plaintiffs to inquire into the defendants’ 
editorial processes and to seek internal documents.119  Under a 
standard that merely turns on the falsity of a published statement, 
information about the internal conduct of a media defendant would 
be largely irrelevant. 
Additionally, plaintiffs who are successful in libel litigation often 
receive tremendous damages awards, which in many cases total in the 
millions.120  Although damages are often reduced following trial, the 
press bears the costs of appeal.121  The magnitude of jury awards for 
libel has sparked a dramatic spike in litigation costs faced by the 
press.  The size of awards compels other would-be plaintiffs to bring 
lawsuits because of the prospects of receiving favorable settlements.122  
That escalation of lawsuits, combined with the prospect of incurring 
tremendous liability and litigation costs, in turn spurs the press to 
                                                 
judging the media’s responsibility.  Libel juries, no longer merely providing 
recompense to the plaintiff, are imposing punishment for the defendant’s 
irresponsible conduct.”). 
 118. See Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey Bennett, Is the New York Times “Actual 
Malice” Standard Really Necessary?  A Comparative Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1153, 1154-
55 (1993) (arguing that the actual malice standard encourages plaintiffs to seek 
costly discovery because discovery is the only way to determine whether a defendant 
acted recklessly or knowingly). 
 119. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979) (holding that plaintiffs can 
use discovery to inquire into the editorial process); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF 
DEFAMATION § 1:26 (2d ed. 2006) (theorizing that the actual malice standard’s true 
effect was to invite greater public scrutiny upon the press’ practices). 
 120. See Anderson, supra note 71, at 514 n.130 (providing examples of multi-
million dollar awards that have been handed down by juries); Weaver & Bennett, 
supra note 118, at 1153-54 (noting that there were “virtually no recoveries” in libel 
suits following Sullivan, yet the number of libel suits grew in the years that followed it 
and plaintiffs eventually won massive awards); see also Barrett, supra note 71, at 865–
67 (attributing the large damages to incommensurability between monetary damages 
and psychic, reputational harm). 
 121. See Weaver & Bennett, supra note 118, at 1181 (remarking that most libel 
defendants lost at trial but eventually win after a costly appeal).  Moreover, the 
availability of remittitur does not undo the hefty costs of providing discovery.  See 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774 (1985) (White, 
J., concurring) (remarking that regardless of the scope of awards won by successful 
plaintiffs, media defendants must bear the cost of providing pre-trial discovery). 
 122. See Smolla, supra note 4, at 7 (“The prospect of such lucrative awards is likely 
to entice more potential defamation plaintiffs to bring suit despite the fact that their 
claims do not meet the legal standards that appellate courts are struggling to 
impose.”).  Smolla attributes the rise in huge awards to a cultural desire to protect 
mental well-being.  Id. at 17. 
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seek preventative legal advice, insurance, and more expensive legal 
services.123 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE TO PROMOTE A RESPONSIBLE 
PRESS 
At the crux of Gertz is the notion that Sullivan balanced two 
competing interests:  the state’s interest in protecting reputation and 
the constitutional interest in avoiding a chilling effect on the press.124  
Yet the creation of the actual malice standard, as opposed to the 
absolute protection standard advocated by the concurring justices in 
Sullivan,125 reveals that a third interest was also at play in the decision.  
After all, a standard constructed to satisfy only the two interests 
discussed in Gertz would appear similar to the protection advocated in 
the Sullivan concurrences.126  Under the standard advocated in the 
concurrences, there would be absolute protection for the press, but 
that protection would be limited to suits brought by public plaintiffs, 
whose reputational injuries are mitigated by counterspeech and 
waived by the assumption of risk tied to attaining public 
prominence.127 
                                                 
 123. See Ronald A. Cass, Principle and Interest in Libel Law After New York Times:  An 
Incentive Analysis, in THE COST OF LIBEL:  ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 103 
(Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989) (arguing that these litigation costs 
“consume a large portion of the savings conferred by the more press-protective 
rule”); see also Epstein, supra note 52, at 145 (arguing that legal expenses increase the 
uncertainty of libel litigation, thereby making newspapers more risk averse in 
reporting). 
 124. See supra note 63 (mentioning that the Court accommodated both interests 
by limiting the protection of the press to statements made about public officials). 
 125. See supra notes 65-68 (explaining the Gertz Court’s rationale for imposing the 
actual malice standard). 
 126. Based solely on the Court’s discussion of the importance of political speech 
in Sullivan, it certainly seemed that such protection would be granted.  After 
discussing the importance of political speech generally, the Court stated, “If neither 
factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield 
from criticism of official conduct, the combination of the two elements is no less 
inadequate.”  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).  The Court did 
not explain why the constitutional limitation on defamation liability extends solely to 
intentional or reckless defamatory statements. 
 127. Ironically, the Court in Gertz recognized that a constitutional protection of 
press speech, standing alone, would be absolute: 
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, however, not the 
only societal value at issue.  If it were, this Court would have embraced long 
ago the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and 
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation.  Such a rule would, 
indeed, obviate the fear that the prospect of civil liability for injurious 
falsehood might dissuade a timorous press from the effective exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms.  Yet absolute protection for the communications 
media requires a total sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of 
defamation. 
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Instead of providing this protection, the Court also refused to 
protect intentional or reckless publications of false statements.  
However, neither the interest in avoiding a chilling effect on the 
press nor the interest in protecting plaintiffs’ reputations justifies or 
requires that limitation.  The remaining conclusion is that Sullivan 
was also grounded on the third supposition that the First 
Amendment does not protect the press when it intentionally or 
recklessly lies to the public.128  In sum, the Court in Sullivan was 
concerned with balancing three interests:  (1) the need to protect 
plaintiffs’ reputations (a compelling interest held by the state), 
(2) the need to protect the press’s speech (an interest spawned from 
the Constitution), and (3) the need to ensure that the press is 
honest.129 
Essentially, the Court in Sullivan engaged in quality control of 
political speech in creating the actual malice standard.  The Court 
did not explain whether this limitation stemmed from prudential or 
constitutional grounds.  It is conceivable that the Court merely 
balked at protecting an individual who lies, even when the lies 
concern political matters at the “core” of First Amendment 
protection.  Alternatively, the Court may have created the actual 
malice standard under the tacit belief that an honest press facilitates 
a broad-based discussion of important matters, and that the 
Constitution therefore does not protect falsehoods that are 
intentionally or recklessly published. 
The remaining issues, then, are the source and breadth of the 
interest in an honest press, to the extent that such an interest exists at 
                                                 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (internal citations omitted).  
The Court, however, did not notice the gaping hole in this claim:  where the 
limitation of press liability to statements made with actual malice fit into its scheme 
of bilateral competing interests. 
 128. It might be argued that a second possible conclusion is that the state has a 
legitimate interest in protecting every plaintiff, public or not, from falsehoods 
uttered with actual malice.  The arguments in Gertz, however, apply just as much to 
false statements that are uttered with actual malice as to those that are negligently 
uttered.  First, the impact of public counterspeech in alleviating reputational injury 
does not turn on the speaker’s motive or intent.  Second, there is no reason to 
believe that a public plaintiff does not also assume the risk of bearing the brunt of 
malicious lies in addition to mistaken falsehoods. 
 129. In his plurality opinion in Curtis, Justice Harlan recognized that Sullivan was 
moved by this third interest: 
[T]o take the rule found appropriate in New York Times to resolve the 
‘tension’ between the particular constitutional interest there involved and 
the interests of personal reputation and press responsibility . . . would be to 
attribute to this aspect of New York Times an unintended inexorability at the 
threshold of this new constitutional development. 
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 (1967) (plurality opinion) (internal 
citation omitted). 
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all.130  It stands to reason that because Sullivan and Gertz did not 
discuss that interest, examining it may expose the need for a new 
standard to govern the constitutional regime of libel law.  The 
argument of this Part is that the interest in an honest press is derived 
from the Constitution, and that the First Amendment requires a 
standard that deters negligent media conduct.  To reach that 
conclusion, it is necessary to examine the interplay between the press 
and the interests that serve as the cornerstone of the First 
Amendment. 
A. The Relationship Between the First Amendment and the Press 
Although scholars have identified multiple interests that underlie 
the First Amendment, two have surfaced most frequently throughout 
the Court’s free speech jurisprudence:  the interest in advancing 
democracy-enhancing speech and the interest in promoting the 
marketplace of ideas.131  Both interests are social insofar as they focus 
on the role of speech in promoting some collective good, be it the 
assurance of an effective government or the ascertainment of truth.132  
The press uniquely furthers both interests by disseminating 
information and by providing a forum for public debate.  The press is 
also capable of devoting time, resources, and reporting experience 
                                                 
 130. Of course, it is also possible that the third interest does not actually exist, 
such that the Court was wrong in turning the protection on the speaker’s state-of-
mind in the first place.  If it does not, the semi-absolute protection discussed above 
would be warranted, and the press would be absolutely protected when speaking 
about a public plaintiff.  The discussion of the press’s role in facilitating the 
fundamental First Amendment interests, however, reveals that there is in fact an 
interest in an honest press. 
 131. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
YALE L.J. 877, 878-89 (1963) (advocating that the freedom of expression is necessary 
to:  (1) assure individual self-fulfillment, (2) attain the truth, (3) secure participation 
by society in the political process, and (4) maintain the balance between stability and 
change in society). 
 132. Another interest frequently discussed throughout First Amendment literature 
is that free speech maximizes individual self-fulfillment.  That is, by debating and 
discussing ideas, people are more capable of forming their normative beliefs and 
acquiring knowledge.  See Emerson, supra note 131, at 879-81 (arguing that every 
person has the right to form and express their own beliefs and opinions); Martin H. 
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594-95 (1982) (arguing that 
the interest in self-realization is the primary interest underlying the First 
Amendment).  While this interest has received a great deal of attention from 
scholars, it has played a relatively minor role in discussions of the freedom of the 
press or of defamation generally.  Because the primary role of the press is to facilitate 
debate and the dissemination of ideas among the masses, it has a more substantial 
effect on the social interests of the First Amendment (i.e., the marketplace of ideas 
and democratic speech interests) than the private interest of self-fulfillment. 
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toward the investigation of stories, thereby enabling it to provide 
information that most individuals cannot acquire alone.133 
1. Democracy-enhancing speech and the marketplace of ideas 
Sullivan was largely premised on the view that the Constitution 
protects free speech “to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.”134  Justice Brandeis famously expressed this view of the First 
Amendment as fostering the dissemination of political speech in his 
oft-cited concurrence in Whitney v. California:135 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of 
the state was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that 
in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the 
arbitrary . . . . They believed that freedom to think as you will and 
to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth . . . . Believing in the power of reason as 
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced 
by law—the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the 
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the 
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be 
guaranteed.136 
Consequently, free speech is not an end in itself but rather a means 
toward advancing self-governance by fostering individual political 
decision-making.137  When free speech is protected, individuals can 
acquire the information necessary to develop their political notions.  
Conversely, individuals are also free to communicate their views to 
others and to seek to persuade them.138 
By allowing for widespread debate, speech cultivates the 
development of social consensus on political matters and the 
formation of groups with common political goals.139  In this sense, 
                                                 
 133. See Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 170 (discussing the importance of 
news investigation and reporting for the furtherance of First Amendment interests). 
 134. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (citing Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
 135. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 136. Id. at 375–76, cited in Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. 
 137. See Heather Maly, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don’t Publish at All:  Forum 
Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the First Amendment Un-Guaranteed, 14 J.L. & 
POL’Y 883, 889 (2006) (“Free speech is respected as a necessity to democratic self-
government and is prized for its protection of the free exchange of ideas.”). 
 138. See Emerson, supra note 131, at 882–84 (noting that freedom of 
communication is essential to democratic governments because it allows constituents 
to voice their opinions to their elected representatives). 
 139. See id. at 882-84 (describing how the freedom of expression allows people to 
participate in democratic decision-making through a process of open 
communication available to all members of the community). 
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political parties are a product of a society that tolerates speech, as 
they require unfettered ability to advance platforms.  Speech also 
allows individuals to directly communicate their views and needs to 
the government.  Demonstrations, letters to congressmen and op-eds 
in newspapers provide the public with access to the ears of their 
representatives and thereby shape government action.140 
The Court has also long recognized a second interest underlying 
the First Amendment:  that a debate free of governmental restraint is 
necessary for the ascertainment of truth.  Justice Holmes 
encapsulated this notion in his metaphor of the marketplace of ideas: 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundation of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market . . . .141 
Underlying this interest is a conception of truth as relativistic or at 
least as difficult to pin down, such that no official or individual can 
serve as sole arbiter of accepted fact.142  Thus, as with the interest in 
democracy-enhancing speech, free expression is once again viewed as 
a process for the attainment of a social good.  Here, that social good 
is the development of a general canon of truth. 
2. The role of a responsible press in facilitating First Amendment interests 
i. Democracy-enhancing speech 
The press plays a key role in effectuating the fundamental First 
Amendment interests of promoting democracy-enhancing speech 
and the marketplace of ideas.  As noted, both interests are social in 
nature and, therefore, require mass communication and a common 
source of information from which political views can be developed 
and truth can be ascertained.143  Moreover, to use Alexander 
Meiklejohn’s metaphor, the press serves as a kind of town hall in 
                                                 
 140. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). (declaring that the 
information provided by the press enables citizens to vote intelligently and form well-
reasoned opinions on the administration of government). 
 141. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 142. Judge Learned Hand eloquently made this point:  “[Free expression] 
presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude 
of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.”  United States v. 
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
 143. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 131, at 883 (advocating that every democracy 
“must have some process for feeding back to it information concerning the attitudes, 
needs and wishes of its citizens”). 
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which political debate can occur.144  Both the Court and the Framers 
have extensively noted the unique service provided by the press in 
supplying a forum for public debate and facilitating communication 
between citizens and government.145 
The press also creates democracy-enhancing speech when it 
reports on political affairs.  As far back as the founding of the United 
States, the press has been viewed as a watchdog of the government, 
charged with ensuring that politicians do not abuse their power and 
that government runs efficiently and effectively.146  Vincent Blasi 
famously argued that the First Amendment protects free expression 
to ensure that the public retains a “checking power” on the 
government’s exercise of authority.147  Because of its independence 
from government and its ability to investigate stories and quickly 
spread information, the press retains a near monopoly on the 
checking power.148  Private individuals seeking to expose corruption 
turn to the press to get the story out, and reporters frequently 
investigate other public and private malfeasance.  Accordingly, in 
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,149 the Court declared that 
“[t]he daily newspaper . . . [is] essential to the effective functioning 
                                                 
 144. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
OF THE PEOPLE 26–27 (1960). 
 145. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667-68 (1990) 
(commenting on the “unique role” of the press in informing and educating the 
public and providing a public forum for debate); Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. 
Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583-84 (1983) (examining the important 
role served by the press during the American Revolution); Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. 
at 491-92 (discussing the role of the press in communicating with the government to 
provide full and accurate information to the public); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 
383 (1947) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“A free press lies at the heart of our democracy 
and its preservation is essential to the survival of liberty.”); Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“A free press is 
indispensable to the workings of our democratic society.”); Letter from James 
Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103, 103 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (“A popular Government, without popular information, or 
the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps 
both.”); Thomas Jefferson, Democracy 150-51 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1939), quoted in 
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 208 n.6 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur liberty 
depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being 
lost.”). 
 146. See supra Part III.A (explaining how the press’ role in bringing information to 
the public allows the public to engage in more efficient political decision-making); 
see also C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 348–50 
(1998) (noting the watchdog role of the press is based on the idea that providing 
information to the public to facilitate self-governance promotes wise decision-making 
from elected leaders). 
 147. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 534–35 (1977). 
 148. See id. at 601–03 (explaining the unique importance of newsgathering and 
investigation in maintaining a checking power). 
 149. 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
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of our political system” because it seeks to “vigilantly scrutiniz[e] the 
official conduct of those who administer the state” and serves “as a 
potent check on arbitrary action or abuse.”150  In addition to its role 
in reporting on political corruption, the press bolsters the 
effectiveness of government by ensuring that politicians exercise 
good and informed judgment, act in good faith, and are capable of 
fulfilling their representative duties.151 
Because it scrutinizes political activity and promotes good 
governance, the press has long been viewed as holding a special place 
within the constitutional framework.  This view of the press is 
encapsulated in its traditional epithet as the “Fourth Estate” or 
“fourth branch of government” that provides a check upon the 
government at all levels.152  The Court has ascribed to the view that 
the Framers intended the press to oversee the entirety of 
government.  Writing for the Court in Mills v. Alabama,153 Justice 
Black argued: 
The Constitution specifically selected the press . . . to play an 
important role in the discussion of public affairs . . . . [T]he press 
serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any 
abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally 
chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people 
responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.”154 
The press therefore has a “constitutionally designated” duty to spread 
information to the public.155  As Justice Potter Stewart argued, the 
Framers consequently intended the press to hold a privileged role 
within the First Amendment scheme.156 
                                                 
 150. Id. at 602. 
 151. See Emerson, supra note 131, at 882–84 (asserting that freedom of the press is 
not simply beneficial to the political process, but rather is a crucial component of a 
successful democracy). 
 152. See Amanda S. Reid & Laurence B. Alexander, A Test Case for Newsgathering:  
The Effects of September 11, 2001 on the Changing Watchdog Role of the Press, 25 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L. REV. 357, 360 (2005) (“The traditional watchdog role of the press developed 
the Fourth Estate function, where the press served as a check on the three branches 
of government.”); Justice Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” Address at the Yale Law 
School Sesquicentennial Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974), in 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 
(1975) (opining that just as the primary purpose of establishing three branches of 
the federal government was to promote checks and balances, the guaranteeing 
freedom of the press was a means of preventing autocracy). 
 153. 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
 154. Id. at 219 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
 155. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 571-72 (1978) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that unannounced police searches of a student newspaper 
violated the constitutional protections given to the press). 
 156. See Stewart, supra note 152, at 634 (“The primary purpose of the 
constitutional guarantee of a free press was . . . to create a fourth institution outside 
the Government as an additional check on the three official branches.”). 
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This view of the press as an independent, quasi-constitutional 
entity—or at least one necessary for the free flow of democracy-
enhancing speech—sheds light on the relationship of the 
government and press in facilitating constitutional interests.  Cass 
Sunstein argued that the First Amendment, although framed as a 
negative right, in fact has positive elements.157  Professor Sunstein 
used the example of the hostile audience scenario, wherein the 
government is obligated to restrain a hostile audience to ensure that 
a speaker can communicate its message.158  In this respect, the First 
Amendment contains a normative component:  it does not merely 
proscribe the government from restraining speech, but it seeks to 
maximize speech and even requires that speech be subsidized.159  To 
the extent that the press serves as a unique facilitator of the spread of 
democratic ideas and political debate, it is necessary for the 
fulfillment of the positive vision of the First Amendment recognized 
by Professor Sunstein.  That is, the Framers saw the protection of free 
expression as a means of maximizing democracy-enhancing speech 
and the press as integral to the fruition of that vision.160 
Because the press has a monopoly on speech impacting one of the 
core concerns of the First Amendment, it is imperative that reporters 
and editors responsibly exercise that power.  Following Sullivan, the 
Court solely approached defamation litigation as though it were an 
indirect form of seditious libel, through which private individuals 
could impose a chilling effect on press speech.161  However, the Court 
has not taken the inverse perspective and focused on the ways that 
press coverage can impact good governance and political discourse.162  
Simply put, when the press spreads false information—negligently or 
                                                 
 157. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 273–74 (1992) 
(asserting that while the First Amendment is framed as protecting citizens from 
government incursions, it also includes government obligations to provide certain 
services to citizens as well). 
 158. See id. (explaining that the governmental protection from physical harm at 
the hands of an angered audience represents a positive element to the right to free 
speech). 
 159. See id. at 274 (arguing that libel requires public plaintiffs to sacrifice their 
reputations as a subsidy for a free press). 
 160. See Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 170 (observing the that First 
Amendment’s goals of promoting self-government and checking the state’s power 
are dependent upon a news media that addresses issues of public importance). 
 161. See Blasi, supra note 147, at 574–78 (arguing that the Supreme Court sought 
to prevent a chilling effect on the checking power of the press in the line of 
defamation cases in the decade following Sullivan); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (comparing the imposition of defamation liability to the 
Sedition Act of 1798). 
 162. See Blasi, supra note 147, at 574-75 (positing that the key concept of the 
Sullivan decision was the analogy to the crime of seditious libel, not self-
government). 
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intentionally—it inhibits the public’s ability to make informed 
political choices.  Moreover, because the press has the virtually 
exclusive ability to oversee the entirety of the government, an 
irresponsible press fails to fulfill its role as the sole independent 
watchdog of the government. 
If we push the metaphor of the press as the fourth branch of 
government to its literal end and take seriously the magnitude of the 
press’s importance in facilitating the democratic process, then as with 
any governmental body, the power of the press should be subject to 
its own checks.  It is understandable that the Court is hesitant to allow 
any such oversight.  If the government regulated the press, then it 
might abuse that authority and seek to limit the press’s checking 
power.163  If private individuals can indirectly check the press through 
defamation suits, then the Court’s fear of a self-imposed chilling 
effect could be realized.164  Yet regardless of whether any specific form 
of regulation is desirable, the point remains that a press that lies to 
the public or negligently publishes falsehoods vitiates its role in 
facilitating democracy-enhancing speech and thereby harms the 
populace’s ability to effectively govern itself.165  Thus, to the extent 
that it is feasible, the implementation of a regulatory scheme or 
constitutional standard that maximizes the truth-telling of the press 
and avoids sacrificing the press’s independence would best serve the 
democracy-enhancing ends of the First Amendment. 
ii. The marketplace of ideas 
The metaphor of the marketplace of ideas is just as apt in 
illustrating the importance of a responsible press.  Owen Fiss argued 
that economic theory concerning the marketplace of goods is 
applicable to First Amendment theory concerning the marketplace of 
                                                 
 163. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas:  A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 
1, 56 (“If courts permit reformers to alter the first amendment’s traditional role as a 
limitation on governmental authority so as to authorize affirmative government 
action to apportion access rights to the marketplace, the judiciary unwittingly may 
create a massive censorship system masquerading as marketplace reform.”). 
 164. See Judy, supra note 75, at 562-63 (providing conflicting evidence as to 
whether libel suits affect the media’s conduct); see also Weaver & Bennett, supra note 
118, at 1189-90 (noting that editors consult defamation attorneys and alter articles 
because of liability concerns, but concluding that this chilling effect is minimal, and 
may even be beneficial). 
 165. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 400 (1974) (White, J., 
dissenting) (“It is not at all inconceivable that virtually unrestrained defamatory 
remarks about private citizens will discourage them from speaking out and 
concerning themselves with social problems.  This would turn the First Amendment 
on its head.”). 
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ideas.166  Just as the government must create economic regulations to 
prevent market failures, failures of the media can be ameliorated 
through government intervention.167  Professor Fiss pointed to two 
failures of the media as evidence of the need for such regulation.  
First, he argued that the media privileges select groups over others 
and thus does not provide equal access to or equal coverage of 
information.168  Second, Professor Fiss argued that the media seeks 
profit rather than the furtherance of the marketplace of ideas, and it 
therefore might provide false information or information that does 
not facilitate the truth-seeking end of the First Amendment.169 
Negligent or intentionally false reporting constitutes a third market 
failure:  the public cannot succeed in ascertaining truth if its 
discourse rests upon false premises.  Moreover, if the press has free 
reign to spread falsehoods or to negligently report, the public may 
lose confidence in the integrity of the conclusions derived from the 
marketplace of ideas.170  Thus, any constitutional standard that allows 
the press to negligently or intentionally spread false information 
hampers the First Amendment goal of fostering a truth-seeking 
public interchange of conjecture and debate. 
                                                 
 166. See Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787-88 (1987) (arguing 
that the market constrains the presentation of matters of public interest in two ways:  
(1) the market privileges select groups by making programs responsive to their 
needs, and (2) the market incentivizes editorial and programming decisions that may 
be based more on profitability than on the public’s needs).  Professor Fiss made this 
point in response to an article by Professor Coase.  In that article, Professor Coase 
made the opposing argument that the laissez faire view of the marketplace of ideas 
should be applied to economic markets.  See R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the 
Market for Ideas, 64 AM. EC. REV. 384 (1974) (arguing that in the market for ideas, 
government regulation is undesirable and should be strictly limited). 
 167. See Fiss, supra note 166, at 787 (pointing out that “competition among 
[media] institutions is far from perfect, and some might argue for state intervention 
on a theory of market failure”); see also Ingber, supra note 163, at 5 (positing that 
market failures might need to be cured by state intervention). 
 168. Fiss, supra note 166, at 787–88. 
 169. Id. at 788 (“[T]here is no necessary, or even probabilistic, relationship 
between making a profit . . . and supplying the electorate with the information they 
need to make free and intelligent choices . . . .”).  An apt example of this problem 
arose following the Columbine shootings, when there was an increased call for 
scrutiny of depictions of violence in the media.  To the extent that those depictions 
are socially harmful and of little value in ascertaining truth, they may be deemed a 
substantial market failure.  See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, Current Proposals for Media 
Accountability in Light of the First Amendment, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH 269 (Ellen Frankel 
Paul et al. eds., 2004). 
 170. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (remarking that untrue, 
defamatory statements made by the press may discourage citizens from participating 
in government decision-making). 
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The notion that an unencumbered marketplace of ideas leads to 
the discovery of truth171 is founded on the premise that the process of 
freely discussing ideas is the best available means of discovering truth.  
However, there is no reason to believe that a completely open forum 
of discussion is better than any other means of ascertaining truth.172  
An alternative process that maximizes truth-telling by the press would 
better facilitate the marketplace of ideas by ensuring to the greatest 
extent possible that it is not corrupted by lies or negligent falsehoods. 
Even if it is impossible to know the truth of a proposition, it is 
possible to identify regulations of speech that reduce the intentional 
or negligent spread of falsehoods.  When a newspaper lies, we know 
that the marketplace of ideas is tainted with a falsehood.  Just the 
same, when a newspaper acts negligently in reporting a story, we 
know that it is more likely that the marketplace is similarly tainted.  A 
constitutional standard that reduced media negligence would 
consequently bolster the public’s ability to ascertain truth and 
thereby facilitate the constitutional interest in maintaining an 
otherwise free marketplace of ideas.  In this respect, it is possible to 
optimize the process by which the marketplace of ideas functions 
while remaining neutral to its contents.173 
B. The Need to Reform the Actual Malice Standard 
Unlike other tort actions, the interests at stake in libel suits are not 
bilateral.174  That is, they are not limited to the reputation of the 
                                                 
 171. See Emerson, supra note 131, at 882 (“Since facts are discovered and opinions 
formed only by the individual, the system demands that all persons participate.”). 
 172. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH:  A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 19–29 (1982) 
(questioning whether knowledge is more likely to be gained in a society in which 
views are freely expressed); see also LEE BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 133–45 
(1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court should move away from its hands-off 
attitude toward modern mass media). 
 173. Justice Harlan expounded upon this view in his plurality opinion in Curtis: 
Impositions based on misconduct can be neutral with respect to content of 
the speech involved, free of historical taint, and adjusted to strike a fair 
balance between the interests of the community in free circulation of 
information and those of individuals in seeking recompense for harm done 
by the circulation of defamatory falsehood. 
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (plurality opinion). 
The notion that the marketplace of ideas can be “improved” through regulations 
of the press is not a new one.  See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-
90 (1969) (upholding the FCC imposition of a “fairness doctrine” on broadcasted 
statements that bear on a controversial issue or matter of public importance because 
broadcast waves are a limited resource and the First Amendment does not prohibit 
the government from requiring broadcasters to act as public trustees).  See generally 
CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY & THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993) (approving of 
regulations of the media for the purpose of improving the marketplace of ideas). 
 174. See Sunstein, supra note 157, at 269–70 (stating that the interests at stake in 
defamation suits are both private and public ones). 
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plaintiff and the potential chilling effect on the defendant.  Rather, 
the public has an interest in a press that does not merely report in 
good faith, but which also comports to a standard of conduct that 
maximizes truth-telling in news reports.175  Sullivan concluded that 
the First Amendment interest in democracy-enhancing speech is 
compromised when the Court underprotects the media, as plaintiffs 
could indirectly chill the speech of media defendants.176  Just the 
same, however, that interest is compromised when the Court 
overprotects media speech and shields the press from any liability for 
negligent conduct.177  When the press is overprotected, it is more 
likely to engage in irresponsible conduct, and as noted, to impede 
democracy-enhancing and truth-seeking speech.  What is needed, 
then, is not a glut of protection but a new standard that at once 
accommodates the interests in avoiding a chilling effect and in 
maximizing media truth-telling, as well as in protecting plaintiffs’ 
reputations. 
Thus, the Court must amend the actual malice standard to require 
or encourage responsible journalistic practices.  As argued above, the 
interest in a responsible press is constitutional, or it is at least 
necessary for the fulfillment of other fundamental constitutional 
interests.178  This is not a novel claim—its roots extend to numerous 
First Amendment decisions and the writings of many of the 
Framers.179  Because the Supreme Court is the primary arbiter of 
constitutional meaning and dictates,180 it is the obligation of the 
Court to create a new standard that eliminates the perverse incentives 
spurred by the actual malice standard. 
                                                 
 175. See Ingber, supra note 163, at 4 (arguing that free expression provides 
aggregate benefits to society). 
 176. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278–79 (1964). 
 177. This point is aptly made in one of the only articles to discuss the 
overprotection of the actual malice standard: 
[T]he way in which journalism is practiced has significant implications for 
First Amendment theory.  The viability of the First Amendment’s goals of 
fostering self-governance and checking the power of the state, for example, 
depends upon the existence of a news media that is engaged in serious 
coverage and investigation of issues of public import. Therefore, the extent 
to which the Court creates incentives and disincentives for journalists to act 
in furtherance of these goals is of considerable First Amendment interest. 
Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 169–70. 
 178. See supra Part III (arguing that a responsible press fulfills the constitutional 
interests of promoting democracy-enhancing speech and sustaining a marketplace of 
ideas). 
 179. See supra Parts I.A, III.B. 
 180. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 18–19 (4th ed. 2003) 
(discussing three views regarding the Supreme Court’s authority to interpret the 
Constitution). 
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One might argue that the interest in a responsible press is a state 
interest rather than a constitutional interest, such that the Court 
should leave regulation of the press to state legislatures.  The obvious 
objection to that claim is that handing regulatory power over the 
press to state legislatures would allow governments to directly chill 
press speech.  Additionally, even if legislatures could be trusted to 
regulate the press, the constitutional standard created by the Court in 
Sullivan would continue to generate the perverse incentives that 
defeat the purported state interest.181  The actual malice standard 
would therefore obstruct states’ ability to act upon their interest in 
promoting responsible media conduct, if such an interest exists.  
Absent a constitutional amendment, the Court is the only body 
capable of reforming the actual malice standard.182  Thus, even if the 
interest in a responsible press is not held by the states, it is incumbent 
upon the Court to either fashion a new standard that does not 
generate perverse incentives, or to allow the states to fashion their 
own standard.183 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION OF A SUMMARY PROCEEDING THAT 
PROMOTES MEDIA RESPONSIBILITY, REMEDIES REPUTATIONAL HARM, 
AND REDUCES LITIGATION COSTS 
Gertz implied that the constitutional standard governing libel law 
should accommodate all the interests at stake in defamation suits.  
Ironically, Sullivan failed to sufficiently accommodate any of them.  
                                                 
 181. See supra Part II.A. 
 182. Professor Anderson argued that the Sullivan standard has so permeated the 
regime of libel law that any political constituency for statutory reform has been 
effectively crowded out by the Supreme Court. 
[The Court] has created not merely a few constitutional limitations on state 
tort rules, but a matrix of substantive principles, evidentiary rules, and de 
facto innovations in judge-jury roles and other procedural matters.  These 
are all constitutionally based and can only be changed by those who have the 
power to change constitutional rules. 
Anderson, supra note 71, at 554. 
 183. One might also argue that there is neither a constitutional nor state interest 
in a responsible press—that is, that no such interest exists at all.  Through the 
arguments in the above discussion, I attempted to show that the Framers and the 
Court envisioned the press as holding a special role within the First Amendment 
framework, and that negligent reporting frustrates that role.  Moreover, the First 
Amendment bears positive elements insofar as it seeks to maximize the spread of 
democracy-enhancing and truth-seeking speech.  It follows that at the very least, the 
government bears a normative duty to regulate the press to ensure that both types of 
speech are in fact maximized, which requires the minimization of false speech to the 
extent possible.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (holding 
that falsehoods have “no constitutional value” and fall under the Chaplinsky category 
of unprotected speech); BOLLINGER, supra note 172, at 139 (arguing that the 
Supreme Court should allow the regulation of press speech to deter “biases that 
skew, distort, and corrupt” discussion of public issues). 
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As argued above, the actual malice standard underprotects speech 
because it forces the press to bear substantial litigation costs.  At the 
same time, it overprotects speech by failing to deter media 
negligence and providing the press with incentives to engage in 
irresponsible conduct.  Lastly, the actual malice standard 
underprotects the reputations of plaintiffs because it allows many 
reputational injuries to go wholly unremedied based on the flawed 
premises that public plaintiffs waive their reputational interests and 
can mitigate reputational harm.  This Part will examine how other 
scholars and jurisdictions have grappled with the problem of 
balancing these three competing interests in libel suits and will 
conclude by proposing a reform that supplements rather than 
replaces the actual malice standard. 
A. Alternative Approaches to Defamation Liability 
1. Recent proposals for reform 
Having recognized the failure of Sullivan to accommodate the 
competing interests underlying libel suits, scholars have proposed 
reforms of the actual malice standard to strike a better balance 
between them.184  One popular proposal is to allow courts to issue 
declaratory judgments that specified statements are false, which 
would rectify injured reputations without imposing liability on media 
defendants.185  An assessment of the veracity of a published statement 
does not turn on the state-of-mind of the media defendant, and 
accordingly no discovery is required to successfully bring a 
declaratory judgment action.186  Likewise, if declaratory judgments 
                                                 
 184. See infra notes 185 & 195; see also Anderson, supra note 71, at 552 (suggesting 
that a drastic approach to reforming libel law would be for the Court to “retrench” its 
holdings in libel law by abandoning the actual malice standard altogether). 
 185. See, e.g., H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., (1985), reprinted in 74 CAL. L. REV. 809, 832 
(1986) (proposing a declaratory judgment proceeding as a new cause of action for 
defamation exercisable at the option of defendants); see also Sam Conner et al., Model 
Communicative Torts Act, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1990) (demonstrating the 
substance of a model provision that would impose liability for injury to reputation in 
an action either for declaratory judgment or special damages, and presuming 
reputational harm in any action for declaratory judgment).  But see Barrett, supra 
note 71, at 852-53 (explaining the differences between the declaratory judgment 
alternative proposed in H.R. 2846, and the alternative proposed by Professor 
Franklin); Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 
CAL. L. REV. 809, 812-19 (1986) (introducing a parallel version to H.R. 2846, but 
departing from it by limiting the availability of the declaratory judgment remedy to 
plaintiffs). 
 186. See Barrett, supra note 71, at 876 (noting that discovery into the editorial 
process would be avoided entirely if defendants win under the declaratory judgment 
alternative); Franklin, supra note 185, at 812 (proposing that “[a]ny person who is 
the subject of any defamation may bring an action in any court of competent 
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wholly replace suits for monetary awards, the pecuniary incentive for 
bringing libel suits would be eliminated.187  To the extent that a court 
decree of a statement’s falsity serves as an adequate remedy for a 
defamatory statement, declaratory judgments would also avoid the 
underprotection of plaintiffs’ reputations.188 
The declaratory judgment proposal, however, would exacerbate 
irresponsible media conduct by failing to address it altogether.  
Granted, replacing the actual malice standard would eliminate the 
incentives pushing against fully investigating stories or 
communicating concerns regarding a story’s accuracy.  Yet where 
media defendants have no fear of liability, they have little reason to 
ensure the factual accuracy of their reports.189  A major newspaper 
may hope to foster a reputation for accuracy, but the same cannot be 
said for smaller news organizations, particularly those that do not 
seek profit, have a monopoly over a small market, or are published 
on the Internet.190  Furthermore, Sullivan revealed that even the 
employees of prominent news organizations might fail to diligently 
check the accuracy of their publications.191  The Times and other 
                                                 
jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment,” and that such an action should not require 
proof of the defendant’s state of mind); see also James H. Hulme, Vindicating 
Reputation:  An Alternative to Damages as a Remedy for Defamation, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 375, 
389–90 (1980-81) (recognizing that because declaratory judgment actions brought by 
plaintiffs are motivated not by damages, but rather by vindication and the desire to 
clear one’s name, the sole issue is the veracity of the defamatory material). 
 187. Under Professor Franklin’s reform proposal, the declaratory judgment is only 
an optional source of recourse for a plaintiff.  Thus, the proposal does not fully avoid 
the underprotection of media speech because the possibilities of large jury awards 
and litigation costs remain.  Professor Franklin’s proposal does provide, however, 
that prevailing plaintiffs at the declaratory judgment phase are barred from later 
seeking damages.  Franklin, supra note 185, at 813. 
Professor Barrett’s proposal would avoid this problem by giving defendants the 
option of going to declaratory judgment.  This would allow defendants to avoid 
litigation expenses.  Barrett, supra note 71, at 864-65.  However, media defendants 
that intentionally publish false statements would almost always turn to declaratory 
judgments for a simple reason:  the state-of-mind of its reporters would not be 
exposed in a declaratory judgment proceeding.  Thus, the declaratory judgment 
provides little disincentive to newspapers that intentionally lie to the public, whereas 
the actual malice standard (to the extent that liability under Sullivan is accurately 
determined) provides exactly that. 
 188. See Hulme, supra note 186, at 389–90 (arguing that a formal court 
determination as to the falsity of a defamatory statement “vindicates” the 
reputational injury of the statement). 
 189. See Franklin, supra note 185, at 839 (criticizing the declaratory judgment 
action proposed in H.R. 2846 as removing the deterrent effect of libel law on 
irresponsible publishing). 
 190. Indeed, if Professor Fiss’s comments on media market failures reveal 
anything, it is that publishing some false statements might increase a news 
organization’s popularity and hence, also increase its revenue stream.  See Fiss, supra 
note 166, at 787-88 (asserting that the media market, though diversified within itself, 
moves collectively in one direction and is limited by market reach). 
 191. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1964). 
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major media organizations have greater incentive to oversee their 
employees’ conduct where those organizations are threatened with 
liability for negligent reporting.  Finally, the declaratory judgment 
proposal can promote recklessness on the part of news organizations 
seeking to get a “hot” story out without adequately reviewing it, as the 
absence of any liability undercuts the need for caution before 
releasing damaging statements. 
The source of these flaws in the declaratory judgment proposal is 
that the interest in a responsible press is procedural rather than 
substantive.192  In other words, the interest does not concern the mere 
falsehood of media statements.  Instead, it focuses on the conduct 
leading to the publication of falsehoods.193  As the Court has 
recognized, the publication of falsehoods is inevitable in any society 
that protects free expression.194  Irresponsible media conduct, 
however, is not.  At least in theory, negligent journalism can be 
deterred with an appropriate standard of liability, and consequently, 
fewer instances of defamatory speech would accrue.195 
Alternative reform proposals would provide absolute protection to 
the press for specified categories of speech.196  While these proposals 
would extirpate the chilling effect on the press, they would also 
promote media irresponsibility and would fail to sufficiently remedy 
reputational injuries.  Conversely, courts could allow for increased 
liability against the press or, in the extreme case, impose strict liability 
                                                 
 192. See Blasi, supra note 147, at 586 (noting that the “shortcoming of 
contemporary journalism concerns not the subject matter of reportage but the 
manner”). 
 193. See id. (expressing concern that there is not enough active, in-depth press 
coverage of the government, especially because it is easy for the media to rely on the 
government’s self-issued press releases instead of conducting independent 
investigations). 
 194. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271. 
 195. A related proposal would create a no-money, no-fault trial by which a jury 
could render judgments on the truth of allegedly defamatory publications.  See Pierre 
N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit:  Keeping Sullivan in its Proper Place, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1987-88) (advancing an alternative type of libel action, in which 
no damages would be awarded).  This no-money, no-fault proposal is problematic for 
the same reasons as is the declaratory judgment alternative, but with the added flaw 
of increasing litigation costs. 
 196. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 295 (Black, J., concurring) (asserting that the 
Constitution granted the press an “absolute immunity for criticism of the way public 
officials do their public duty”); id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (supporting an 
“absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct”).  But see Lillian 
Bevier, The Invisible Hand of the Marketplace of Ideas, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT:  FREE 
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 233–35 (Lee Bollinger & Geoffrey Stone eds., 2002) 
(arguing that the press should be held “accountable for the harms that defects in its 
products cause”). 
BARRON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 10/5/2007  7:14:00 PM 
2007] A PROPOSAL TO RESCUE NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN 109 
for the publication of false statements.197  It might at first seem that a 
strict liability standard, which could turn on the substance of a 
statement or the procedures followed in publishing it, might impact 
media responsibility by prompting the press to create and adhere to 
its own codes of conduct that maximize truth-telling.  However, that 
standard would open the doors to litigation before potentially biased 
juries and generate the self-imposed chilling effect feared by the 
Court.198 
This examination of potential reforms reveals that there is an 
inherent tension between the interests at play in libel suits.  
Increasing liability for defamation would deter irresponsible 
reporting, yet any recourse that involves monetary awards risks 
chilling press speech.199  Similarly, replacing the Sullivan standard 
with a pretrial procedure or a no-fault action may avoid a chilling 
effect, yet in addition to the under-deterrence of media negligence 
that would result, it is far from clear that a court determination of the 
veracity of speech vindicates reputational injury.  The result is a lose-
lose situation, since either awarding or failing to award monetary 
damages cannot fully accommodate the competing interests at stake 
in libel suits. 
One might conclude from this tension that it is impossible to 
adequately balance the three interests, and that the Sullivan standard 
may simply represent the best of a slew of unsatisfying options.  This 
conclusion is premature.  The shortcomings of the aforementioned 
reform proposals reveal that the solution to the Sullivan conundrum 
will not arise from tinkering with the types and degree of remedies 
available to plaintiffs.200  That is, the ideal balance between the 
competing interests may be struck by working outside the box of 
remedies and standards of liability.  Before attempting to meet that 
                                                 
 197. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 52, at 148–49 (arguing for a return to common-
law principles of strict liability to determine liability, a proposition that would 
eliminate punitive damages since money should be secondary to restoration of 
reputation); Susana Frederick Fischer, Rethinking Sullivan:  New Approaches in 
Australia, New Zealand, and England, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 101, 107-08 (2002) 
(arguing against a broad constitutional standard and in favor of an extension of 
common-law qualified privilege). 
 198. Professor Anderson raises another point:  by eliminating the actual malice 
standard, the Court would also reduce uniformity in defamation liability, which 
could have its own chilling effect on the media.  See Anderson, supra note 71, at 553 
(recognizing that non-uniformity is especially dangerous in libel law due to the 
inherent interstate mobility of speech). 
 199. While the media’s efforts to avoid liability might appear to be a step toward 
more responsible journalism, these restraints create their own chilling effects on the 
press.  See infra notes 217-221 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra notes 185-198 and accompanying text (elaborating on how efforts to 
protect one interest seem to exacerbate the underprotection of another interest). 
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challenge, it is instructive to examine the way that Britain has 
addressed defamation liability. 
2. Recent trends in British libel law 
In Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd.,201 the House of Lords initiated a 
radical change in British law by recognizing a new standard of 
defamation liability that turns on the responsibility of a media 
defendant’s conduct.  Albert Reynolds, the former Irish Taoiseach, 
initiated the suit in response to an article published by The Sunday 
Times in 1994 that claimed that Reynolds lied to and withheld 
important information from the Irish government.202  Reynolds 
argued that The Sunday Times engaged in irresponsible conduct in 
reporting the story; specifically, the sole source of the article was one 
of Reynolds’s political opponents and the article failed to report on 
the explanation Reynolds provided the Irish government regarding 
the alleged malfeasance.203 
The newspaper argued that the court should impose a standard 
similar to Sullivan, wherein a speaker would be protected from 
liability for speech related to “political information” unless the 
speech was uttered with actual malice.204  The House of Lords 
disagreed.  In the decision, Lord Nicholls argued that the proposed 
malice standard insufficiently remedies reputational harm because 
that standard is “notoriously difficult to prove” and would protect 
newspapers in pursuit of a scoop that release defamatory statements 
“based on the slenderest of materials.”205 
Instead, the House of Lords created an “elastic” ten-factor 
balancing test that looks to the public importance of the speech’s 
subject matter and the reasonableness of the speaker’s conduct.206  
Those ten factors, as presented by Lord Nicholls, are: 
(1) The seriousness of the allegation.  The more serious the 
charge, the more the public is misinformed and the 
individual harmed, if the allegation is not true. 
(2) The nature of the information, and the extent to which the 
subject matter is a matter of public concern. 
                                                 
 201. [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.). 
 202. Id. at 191. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. at 200 (arguing for a standard based solely on the subject matter of the 
publication). 
 205. Id. at 201. 
 206. Id. at 204. 
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(3) The source of the information.  Some informants have no 
direct knowledge of the events.  Some have their own axes to 
grind, or are being paid for their stories. 
(4) Steps taken to verify the story . . . . 
(5) The status of the information.  The allegation may have 
already been the subject of an investigation which 
commands respect. 
(6) The urgency of the matter.  News is often a perishable 
commodity. 
(7) Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff.  He may 
have information others do not possess or have not 
disclosed.  An approach to the plaintiff will not always be 
necessary. 
(8) Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side 
of the story. 
(9) The tone of the article.  A newspaper can raise queries or call 
for an investigation.  It need not adopt allegations as 
statements of fact. 
(10) The circumstances of publication, including the timing.207 
Because The Sunday Times failed to publish Reynolds’s explanation for 
his conduct, used an unreliable source, and presented the allegation 
as a hard fact, the House of Lords found that the newspaper failed 
the balancing test.208 
Despite creating a test that focuses on the defendant’s negligence, 
Lord Nicholls described the decision as merely seeking to 
accommodate the interests in reputation and avoiding a chilling 
effect on the press.209  Given the factors in the balancing test, 
however, it appears that Lord Nicholls was primarily concerned with 
the interest in promoting a responsible press.  Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL,210 a recent 
decision that reaffirmed the ten-part test, the House of Lords 
                                                 
 207. Id. at 205. 
 208. Id. at 206. 
 209. Id. at 205.  Lord Nicholls implied that the need for a responsible press is built 
into the plaintiff’s interest in an uninjured reputation.  Under this view, the interest 
of responsible journalism is in fact a private interest held by the plaintiff.  That is, the 
only interest held by the plaintiff is that damaging statements about the plaintiff are 
made in compliance with the Reynolds standard of fair reporting.  Nevertheless, it is 
impossible to escape the conclusion that the interest in a responsible press is, to at 
least some degree, social.  This is revealed by the fact that Lord Nicholls discussed at 
length the importance of free expression in facilitating political matters.  Id. at 204–
06. 
 210. [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359 (appeal taken from Eng.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd061011/jamee.pd
f. 
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described Reynolds as having created a “test of responsible 
journalism.”211  Lord Bingham also noted that the House of Lords in 
Reynolds accepted that the publication of false statements is inevitable 
in a society that protects speech and therefore sought to ensure that a 
“publisher is protected if he has taken such steps as a responsible 
journalist would take to try and ensure that what is published is 
accurate and fit for publication.”212 
Less than a decade following Reynolds, it remains unclear how 
strong an impact the decision will have on British law.213  For the time 
being, British libel law remains far more plaintiff-friendly than its 
American counterpart, given that the burden remains on British 
defendants to establish the veracity of allegedly defamatory 
statements.214  Reynolds and Jameel are certainly signs that British law is 
shifting toward greater protection of media defendants, yet the 
House of Lords in Jameel emphatically underscored that such 
protection is available only to a responsible press.215  The scope of 
protection for the press therefore turns on the meaning of 
“responsibility,” which will not be fully identified until the Reynolds 
test is refined by lower courts in the years to come.216  If the House of 
Lords deems the Reynolds test a success, it is conceivable that the test 
                                                 
 211. See id. at 32, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, 377 (interpreting the Reynolds test as a general 
guiding principle, rather than a series of individual criteria in order to promote 
veracity and truthfulness in publications concerning the public interest); see also 
Bonnick v. Morris, [2002] UKPC 31, [23], [2003] 1 A.C. 300, 309 (“Stated shortly, 
the Reynolds privilege is concerned to provide a proper degree of protection for 
responsible journalism when reporting matters of public concern.”). 
 212. Jameel, [2006] UKHL 44, 32, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, 377. 
 213. For example, Alan Rusbridger, the editor of the Guardian, stated in response 
to Jameel that “[the decision] will lead to a greater robustness and willingness to 
tackle serious stories.” Sarah Lyall, High Court in Britain Loosens Strict Libel Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2006, at A10; see DAVID PRICE & KORIEH DUODU, DEFAMATION:  LAW, 
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 110–11 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing applications of the Lord 
Nicholls’ test in the years after Reynolds was decided, noting in particular that neutral 
reporting weighs heavily in favor of a finding of responsible journalistic conduct). 
 214. See Anderson, supra note 71, at 504–05 (discussing the importance of placing 
the burden of establishing falsity on plaintiffs in American libel suits).  Scholars have 
questioned whether Reynolds provided enough protection for media defendants.  See 
Weaver & Bennett, supra note 118, at 1156 (arguing that while the British media 
appears “robust,” the press remains vulnerable to a chilling effect stemming from 
Britain’s liberal standards of liability in defamation suits). 
 215. Baroness Hale argued that Britain “need[s] more such serious journalism,” 
and to that end “our defamation law should encourage rather than discourage it.”  
Jameel, [2006] UKHL 44, at 150, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, 409. 
 216. Lord Nicholls emphasized in Reynolds that the lower British courts must 
refine the relatively open-ended standard of responsible journalism as they apply it to 
cases.  See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 205 (H.L.) 
(rationalizing that a judge is better equipped to interpret the criteria than a jury).  In 
Jameel, Lord Hoffman compared this process to the development of any professional 
standards of reasonable conduct within common law.  [2006] UKHL 44, at 55, 
[2007] 1 A.C. 359, 383. 
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will be expanded to cover statements beyond those of public 
importance.217 
While the Reynolds test will certainly compel newspapers to adhere 
to a minimum standard of responsible conduct, it fails to reduce 
litigation costs and therefore risks imposing a chilling effect on the 
press.218  As scholars and journalists have noted, Reynolds sets forth a 
vague and highly discretionary test that leaves news organizations 
incapable of predicting the outcome of defamation suits.219  The 
indeterminacy of the Reynolds test has left litigious plaintiffs with an 
incentive to roll the dice at trial or to threaten suit in pursuit of a 
settlement.  Additionally, British news organizations have incurred 
tremendous costs to comply with the Reynolds factors.220  For example, 
it is not uncommon for major newspapers to retain a legal editorial 
staff to ensure that stories comply with responsible procedures.221  
While the goal of promoting a responsible press is certainly noble, its 
                                                 
 217. See SMOLLA, supra note 119, at § 1:9.50 (arguing that recent decisions portend 
more acceptance of free speech defenses in the U.K.); see also Amber Melville-Brown, 
The Impact of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, 18 COMM. LAW. 25, 28–29 (2001) 
(reiterating the views of prominent British lawyers that the Reynolds decision was 
“potentially revolutionary” and would “open[] up a distinct privilege for investigative 
journalism,” despite concerns that such flexible standards would be difficult to 
apply) (quotations omitted). 
Even if the Reynolds standard does not expand within British law, it has certainly 
expanded to other commonwealth countries.  All of them have rejected Sullivan and 
most have recognized standards of liability that turn at least in part on responsible 
journalism.  See Lange v. Atkinson, [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 385, 400-01 (C.A.) (holding 
that a defendant that engages in careless journalism and acts “without considering or 
caring whether it was true or false” can be held liable) (citation omitted); Lange v. 
Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 532-33, 546 (Austl.) (holding that 
qualified privilege extended to a communication made to the public on a 
government or political matter, but only where the defendant’s actions were 
reasonable); Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.) 
(refusing to create a standard of liability in the mold of Sullivan, declaring that 
“[t]he law of defamation is not [so] unduly restrictive or inhibiting”). 
 218. See Russell L. Weaver et al., Defamation Law and Free Speech:  Reynolds v. Times 
Newspapers and the English Media, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1255, 1263 (2004) 
(conceding that the costs of litigating defamation lawsuits routinely outstrip the 
damages a litigant might receive). 
 219. See id. at 1291, 1303 (arguing that the Reynolds test has caused uncertainty 
amongst the English media because it remains unclear how certain conduct will be 
judged under the criteria); PRICE & DUODU, supra note 213, at 110 (noting that the 
ambit of the Reynolds test was left largely undetermined, such that the test would 
“give rise to an undesirable element of uncertainty”). 
 220. See Weaver, supra note 218, at 1291–97 (describing Reynolds’ impact on the 
editorial processes, including the purchase of defamation insurance to reduce 
litigation costs, and the hiring of attorneys to review articles for compliance with the 
Reynolds factors). 
 221. See Weaver & Bennett, supra note 120, at 1172 (noting that the newspapers’ 
actual purpose is not to strengthen the veracity of published stories, but rather to 
ensure that the editors will have legally admissible evidence to reduce liability in 
defamation suits). 
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high price tag may chill the media’s willingness to report on 
potentially defamatory matters or litigious individuals.222 
B. The Proposal 
The three competing interests in defamation suits can be almost 
perfectly accommodated by blending the declaratory judgment 
proposal and the Reynolds test.223  That is, a media defendant should 
have the option of avoiding defamation liability by obtaining a pre-
trial determination that it adhered to responsible journalistic 
procedures.  Under this summary proceeding, the defendant would 
have the burden of establishing that it satisfied a baseline standard of 
reasonable press conduct.  If successful, the suit would terminate, and 
the defendant would avoid liability altogether.  If unsuccessful, the 
litigation would proceed under the actual malice standard. 
The standard of responsible media conduct would be similar to the 
test created in Reynolds, but with some important differences.  First, 
the Reynolds factors focus too heavily on the circumstances of 
publication and too little on the procedures used in publishing the 
allegedly defamatory statement.224  That is, while the circumstances of 
the publication should bear on the level of scrutiny a statement 
receives, the Reynolds test fails to sufficiently promote reporting 
procedures that would optimize the output of truthful statements.  
Second, the Reynolds test fails to account for a media defendant’s 
behavior after the publication of a false statement.  That is, it does 
not consider whether and to what extent a news organization 
publishes a retraction to a defamatory statement. 
Accordingly, the ideal set of factors considered in the summary 
proceeding would be as follows: 
(1) The amount of investigation—the number of reporters and 
time spent reporting—weighed against the public importance 
of the statement and magnitude of foreseeable reputational 
harm inflicted. 
                                                 
 222. See Weaver, supra note 218, at 1282, 1288-90 (discussing the impact of 
Reynolds on newspapers’ willingness to report on litigious individuals and contentious 
matters). 
 223. This proposal refers specifically to Professor Barrett’s version of the 
declaratory judgment proposal.  See Barrett supra note 71, at 863 (advancing the 
strengths of declaratory judgment in that it targets the source of tension and focuses 
primarily on accuracy). 
 224. For example, four of the ten Reynolds factors focus on the importance of the 
information, the status of the information, the urgency of the story, and the timing 
of publication.  Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 205 (H.L.). 
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(2) The degree to which the allegedly defamatory statements were 
fact-checked, weighed against the reliability of the 
information’s sources. 
(3) The number of editors attached to the story and amount of 
time spent reviewing it. 
(4) The time-sensitivity of the story, relative to its public 
importance.  Merely seeking to get a scoop is not sufficient 
grounds for failing to adequately check a story. 
(5) Whether comment from the plaintiff was timely requested in a 
manner that was reasonably tailored to reach the plaintiff, and 
whether the publication fairly and accurately reflected those 
comments. 
(6) Whether the newspaper retracted the story, and whether the 
retraction was sufficient relative to the prominence of the 
story’s original publication and the magnitude of reputational 
harm inflicted.  For example, a defamatory statement 
published on the front page of a newspaper should be 
retracted on the front page. 
(7) Whether the circumstances of the case or the evidence 
provided suggest that the newspaper was aware of the falsity of 
its statement upon publishing it.225  While the plaintiff may 
offer evidence of actual malice, the plaintiff will have no access 
to discovery from the defendant. 
The first four factors relate to the procedures used in reporting 
and editing the story.  Those factors do not specify the procedures 
that news organizations must adopt, but rather focus on whether the 
procedures implemented were reasonable in light of the public 
importance and time-sensitivity of the story.  The first factor concerns 
the adequacy of the reporting itself, the second and third with the 
adequacy of editorial review, and the fourth with the degree of 
scrutiny warranted in evaluating the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s conduct.  The fifth and sixth factors protect the 
reputations of the injured plaintiffs from libelous speech by 
                                                 
 225. For a similar suggestion in cases involving questions of fact that turn on the 
defendants’ state-of-mind, see David A. Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in the 
Summary Judgment Context:  A Better Approach, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 774, 795 (1983) 
(arguing that “when the movant offers evidence demonstrating innocent motive or 
lack of intent, summary judgment should be granted unless the non-movant offers 
substantial probative evidence contradicting the evidence provided by the movant”); 
see also Martin B. Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in 
Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 707, 715–18 (1984) (arguing for a 
reduced burden of proof in defamation summary judgment proceedings to allow for 
the burden to be shifted to plaintiffs to provide prima facie evidence of actual malice). 
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providing opportunities for counterspeech both during and after 
publication. 
The final factor is essential to ensure that a defendant, to the 
greatest extent possible without infringing on the other two interests, 
does not escape liability for publishing defamatory statements that 
are intentionally or recklessly published.  Evidence presented by the 
plaintiff or, in rare cases, the circumstances of the publication may 
suggest that the defendant acted with actual malice.226  In the rare 
cases where such evidence outweighs the six other factors, the judge 
may refuse to find for the defendant, and the case will proceed.  In 
arguing that a defendant acted with actual malice, the plaintiff will 
not have access to discovery as to the state of mind of the reporters or 
editors attached to the story.  While obtaining sufficient evidence of 
actual malice may be difficult absent some measure of discovery, 
allowing discovery would enable plaintiffs to impose substantial 
litigation costs on media defendants.227  Plaintiffs retain the option of 
conducting their own investigations, such as obtaining statements 
from the individuals quoted in an article. 
While the exclusion of discovery may allow some defendants to 
avoid liability for false statements published with actual malice,228 the 
summary proceeding largely eliminates the likelihood of that 
outcome.  That is, a plaintiff may persuade a judge that the 
defendant relied on too few sources in publishing a story or that the 
sources used were unreliable.  Even if a defendant relied on a 
sufficient number of sources, the plaintiff may establish that the 
defendant manipulated their comments.  Moreover, the defendant 
may have failed to adequately discuss or investigate mitigating 
                                                 
 226. See, e.g., Reynolds, 2 A.C. at 206 (placing particular weight on the defendant’s 
failure to include the plaintiff’s version of story on a simple hunch, rather than 
conducting his own investigation). 
 227. Skeptics may argue that eliminating discovery will be unfair to plaintiffs, who 
will find it difficult to establish actual malice or to rebut a media defendant’s 
evidence of responsible journalism.  Although it is certainly not necessary to 
completely cut off discovery, there must be strictly enforced limits to discovery to 
avoid imposing the litigation costs on media defendants that the proposed summary 
proceeding is tailored to circumvent.  However, as this Article argues, discovery is not 
wholly necessary.  Evidence of irresponsible practices or, in rare cases, of actual 
malice can be established through evidence obtained through plaintiffs’ own 
investigations.  Additionally, plaintiffs will have access to reporters’ and editors’ notes 
and any other evidence of their states-of-mind that are presented by defendants to 
establish their responsible conduct. 
 228. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 n.25 (1979) (noting that the 
discovery generated nearly 3,000 pages and 240 exhibits as well as sustaining 
substantial legal fees); Anderson, supra note 71, at 517 (depicting the actual malice 
standard as a complex factual issue that sometimes requires large amounts of 
discovery to prove). 
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evidence brought to its attention by a source.  Thus, the very fact that 
the summary proceeding promotes responsible media conduct 
substantially limits media defendants’ ability to escape liability for 
reporting in bad faith. 
The sixth factor, concerning the retraction of a defamatory 
statement, should be given more weight than the others.  Through 
that factor, a media defendant almost always has an escape hatch 
from litigation.  Unless the defendant is found to have egregiously 
violated the other factors, it can guarantee an end to further 
proceedings by admitting that a published statement was false and 
retracting a story.  More importantly, a newspaper has the option of 
retracting a statement following the summary proceeding.  That is, a 
judge can find that the defendant negligently reported a story but 
explicitly leave open a window to publish a sufficient retraction that 
thereby allows the defendant to terminate the litigation. 
C. Advantages 
The proposed summary proceeding accommodates all the interests 
at stake in defamation suits, and it avoids the underprotection of 
reputation in three important respects.  First, it encourages the press 
to seek comment from the targets of potentially defamatory 
statements, thereby allowing them to mitigate reputational harm 
concurrent to the publication of false statements.  Second, it provides 
strong incentive for defendants to retract false statements in a 
manner reasonably tailored to reach the same readership as the 
original publication.  Third, by promoting reporting procedures that 
optimize truth-telling, it prevents the occurrence of reputational 
harms in the first place. 
The proposed proceeding avoids the under- and over-protection of 
speech by ensuring that libel suits are quickly and efficiently 
concluded in a manner that promotes optimized reporting 
procedures.229  That is, it allows defendants to avoid both liability and 
litigation costs by complying with a basic standard of responsible 
journalism.  The elimination of litigation costs is thus held out as a 
carrot that compels journalists to alter their behavior.  The speedy 
                                                 
 229. See Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously:  An Analysis of 
Process in Libel Litigation, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1784 (1998) (arguing that the First 
Amendment contains a procedural guarantee for “accuracy, speed and efficiency” in 
disposing of defamation suits). 
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nature of the proceeding and prohibition of discovery further 
minimizes media defendants’ legal costs.230 
The absence of discovery also provides media defendants with a 
means of protecting their privacy.231  The proposed proceeding allows 
defendants to present whatever evidence they choose in arguing that 
they complied with the standard of responsible journalism.  
Defendants are not obligated to turn over any notes or the identity of 
any source.232  Indeed, defendants have the option of refusing to 
initiate the pre-trial proceeding altogether. 
While the proposed proceeding is less vague than the Reynolds test, 
any standard of media responsibility will be vulnerable to some 
degree of vagueness and thus will ultimately be at the judge’s 
discretion.233  Yet two points are worth noting.  Because British libel 
law is considerably plaintiff-friendly, the cost of failing the Reynolds 
test far exceeds that of failing the proposed proceeding.234  Under the 
proposal, if a defendant fails to establish that it acted responsibly, the 
course of litigation continues as it would have otherwise, and actual 
malice will remain difficult to establish.  In other words, where less is 
                                                 
 230. See Anderson v. Stanco Sports Library, Inc., 542 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(noting that the use of summary judgment in libel cases would avoid chilling speech 
by avoiding the litigation of meritless cases); Bon Air Hotel v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 
858, 865 (5th Cir. 1970) (“[T]he failure to dismiss a libel suit might necessitate long 
and expensive trial proceedings, which, if not really warranted, would themselves 
offend the principles enunciated in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) . . . 
because of the chilling effect of such litigation.”) (citation omitted); see also 
Edgartown Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. Johnson, 522 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (D. Mass. 
1981) (“The threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit brought by a popular 
public official may be as chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear 
of the outcome of the lawsuit itself.”) (citation omitted). 
 231. The Supreme Court has recognized that increasing grants of summary 
judgment would avoid requiring media defendants to comply with intrusive 
discovery.  See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 180 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) (holding that 
courts should delay ordering defendants to comply with discovery requests where 
issues pertinent to those requests can be avoided through summary judgment). 
 232. Naturally, relying on an unnamed source should provide a newspaper with 
less protection than a named source, though Lord Nicholls did not seem to think so.  
See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 205 (H.L.) (adding that 
journalists often do not have the benefit of hindsight when meeting publication 
deadlines). 
 233. This is due to the flexible nature of the proposed standard, which mimics the 
flexibility envisioned by Lord Nicholls.  See Reynolds, 2 A.C. at 204-05 (granting 
discretion to judges to interpret and apply the ten factors); see also Russell L. Weaver 
& David F. Partlett, International and Comparative Perspectives on Defamation, Free Speech, 
and Privacy:  Defamation, Free Speech, and Democratic Governance, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
57, 76 (2006) (commenting that the large number of Reynolds factors, coupled with 
the few decisions interpreting those factors, has not provided the media with clear 
signals on how to act under the new framework). 
 234. This assessment does not even consider the costs associated with preventing 
libel suits, which have increased for British media outlets since Reynolds.  See Weaver 
& Partlett, supra note 233, at 77 (calculating the media’s increased legal costs as they 
retain more lawyers to “Reynoldize” the stories). 
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at stake in enforcing the standard of responsible journalism, a degree 
of uncertainty is tolerable. 
Additionally, the proposed standard provides a tremendous benefit 
to the press at no additional cost.  Beyond the obvious benefit of 
providing a strong defense to defamation liability, the vagueness of 
the standard is itself an asset for the press.  That is, it allows the media 
to create its own codes of conduct that shield it from liability, as long 
as those codes satisfy the baseline threshold of responsibility.  
Moreover, because defendants may refuse to initiate the summary 
proceeding, they can circumvent the standard of responsible 
journalism altogether if it concerns them. 
Although summary-judgment proceedings are currently available 
in defamation suits, basing liability on a state-of-mind test has made it 
difficult to dispose of cases before trial.235  A standard of 
reasonableness—while fact-sensitive—is objective, and thus highly 
amenable to pre-trial determination.  Moreover, as the House of 
Lords recognized in Reynolds, turning liability on a list of factors 
allows for the development of a body of precedent upon which judges 
can rely.236  The use of a summary proceeding will therefore provide 
greater consistency to defamation suits.  Likewise, the proposed 
proceeding is advantageous because it takes the fate of media 
defendants out of the hands of potentially biased jurors, who render 
factual determinations in a black box.  Judges’ decisions must be 
openly justified, and biased decisions are checked by the availability 
of appeal.  Accordingly, the expanded availability of pre-trial disposal 
will make defamation suits more predictable, which should further 
decrease media defendants’ legal expenses. 
D. Remaining Issues 
1. Should courts create a standard of responsible journalism? 
The Supreme Court has twice implicitly held that courts should not 
create standards of conduct for journalists:  first in Sullivan, and then 
                                                 
 235. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (noting that a 
finding of actual malice is not easily arrived at during the summary judgment stage); 
Sonenshein, supra note 225, at 786-87 (noting that courts are inconsistent in 
assessing state-of-mind evidence at summary judgment); see also Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1986) (holding that clear and convincing evidence 
is required to succeed on summary judgment in defamation suits); Anderson, supra 
note 71, at 498–99 (arguing that Anderson made it easier to win on summary 
judgment only insofar as it requires that key factual issues be resolved through 
discovery). 
 236. [2001] 2 A.C. at 205 (acknowledging that deferring to the judge is a 
doctrinally sound established practice). 
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in Curtis Publishing v. Butts.237  By shielding the press from defamation 
liability, Sullivan sought to substantially limit judicial supervision of 
the press.238  Three years later, in Curtis, Justice Harlan advocated for 
the reformation of the actual malice standard to promote responsible 
journalism.239  Under Justice Harlan’s standard, defendants would be 
held liable for engaging in “highly unreasonable conduct constituting 
an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and 
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”240  In the 
plurality opinion, Chief Justice Warren provided the deciding vote in 
a separate concurrence but refused to backtrack from the Sullivan 
standard.241  The question the Court has failed to definitively answer is 
whether judges should engage in creating a standard of responsible 
journalism, if they are even capable of doing so. 
In an obvious sense, the actual-malice standard is itself a baseline 
constitutional limit on acceptable press conduct.  That is, by refusing 
to protect statements made with knowledge or reckless disregard of 
falsity, the Court determined that the First Amendment does not 
tolerate the bad-faith publication of false statements.242  Sullivan thus 
established the functional equivalent of a standard of professional 
conduct.  Additionally, as discussed above, neither the interest in 
avoiding a chilling effect on the press, nor the interest in plaintiffs’ 
reputations, is sufficient to serve as the theoretical foundation of the 
actual malice standard.243  The Court in Sullivan therefore appears to 
have been motivated at least in part by the normative conclusion that 
the press should not lie to the public. 
                                                 
 237. 388 U.S. 130 (1966) (plurality opinion). 
 238. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1963) (discussing the need 
for an open and robust press, despite the possibility of attacks on government and 
public officials); Murchison, supra note 5, at 10 (“Journalism was to be free from the 
supervision of libel law; only a calculated lie would endanger that freedom.”). 
 239. See Curtis, 388 U.S. at 135 (desiring a standard that would give the press 
sufficient constitutional protection without immunizing them from irresponsibly 
hurting the reputations of others). 
 240. Id. at 155. 
 241. See id. at 164-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (affirming the importance of the 
Sullivan standard as a necessary protection for the rights of public officials and the 
press). 
 242. See Susan M. Gilles, The Image of “Good Journalism” in Privilege, Tort law and 
Constitutional Law, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 485, 497 (2006) (“The constitutional libel 
law cases also reveal that the Court has created a code of good journalism practices. 
This was not, perhaps, a conscious decision.”). 
 243. See supra notes 75-76, 95-101 and accompanying text (criticizing the actual 
malice standard as releasing the press from any incentive to report reasonably as long 
as their conscience is clean and giving certain individuals less access to public 
counterspeech than more prominent officials and thus making it less likely for them 
to receive damages for libel). 
BARRON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 10/5/2007  7:14:00 PM 
2007] A PROPOSAL TO RESCUE NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN 121 
Sullivan also indirectly led to a court-created standard of 
responsible journalism by allowing plaintiffs to use circumstantial and 
behavioral evidence to prove media defendants’ states of mind.244  
That was the conclusion of a 1994 study by a group of defamation 
scholars who examined all state and federal defamation suits 
following Sullivan.245  They found that lower court decisions in the 
decades after Sullivan “spawned a de facto set of judge-made standards 
that covers all aspects of journalistic behavior,” including the 
investigation, writing and editing of news stories.246 
As the authors of the study argued, the piecemeal method by which 
lower courts created de facto standards of responsible journalism has 
led to a chilling effect on speech by opening the door to increased 
findings of liability against the press.247  The haphazard creation of 
the de facto standards has also led to complex litigation, which has 
increased costs for media defendants.248  The proposed summary 
proceeding would avoid these problems by allowing courts to 
explicitly demarcate baseline journalistic norms, an enterprise in 
which they are already covertly engaged.  As a result, courts would be 
more consistent in developing the standard of responsible 
journalism, media defendants would have greater notice about the 
substance of that standard, litigation costs would be curtailed, and 
appellate courts would be better capable of overseeing lower court 
decisions. 
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that courts are incapable of 
overseeing journalistic conduct.  Courts have already created baseline 
standards of professional conduct through the development of 
common-law malpractice torts.249  Judges should find it easier to 
create and apply a standard of conduct governing journalism than 
                                                 
 244. See Murchison, supra note 5, at 11–12 (criticizing the Sullivan standard 
because by allowing circumstantial behavior, such as use of sources and quality of 
writing, the Court imposed greater judicial supervision, rather than reducing it). 
 245. See id. (remarking that the press seemed to have little inclination to question 
the new defamation paradigm due to the lack of understanding of Sullivan’s true 
implications). 
 246. Id. at 12. 
 247. See id. at 14 (lamenting that Sullivan’s paradoxical logic imposes “an 
increasingly comprehensive and intrusive set of behavioral standards for the press”).  
The de facto standards are akin to the Reynolds test, insofar as liability itself turns on 
having satisfied baseline requirements of responsible journalism. 
 248. See id. at 10 (discovering that while the number of judgments against the 
press may have decreased since Sullivan, the media has incurred substantially greater 
costs). 
 249. See Robert E. Drechsel, Essay, The Paradox of Professionalism:  Journalism and 
Malpractice, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 181, 193 (2000) (observing the “obvious 
linkage between many of the principles of American libel law and professional 
standards”). 
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those concerning other, more technical professions like medicine.  
Doctors must make highly specialized decisions, often while under 
severe time constraints.  Journalists, on the other hand, require no 
specialized licensing and act under relatively artificial deadlines.250  
Indeed, just as courts have extensive precedent upon which they can 
rely in malpractice suits, the evaluation of journalistic conduct will 
not occur on a blank slate.  Beyond the de facto standards of conduct 
already created by lower courts, the majority of state courts apply a 
negligence standard to defamation cases involving private plaintiffs.251  
Both should serve as apt resources in developing the standard of 
responsible journalism. 
The Supreme Court has already shown that it is not averse to 
overtly recognizing baseline standards of professional conduct under 
the Constitution.  In Strickland v. Washington,252 the Court held 
attorney performance in criminal cases to a reasonableness standard, 
citing the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.253  Nevertheless, the 
Court refused to delineate “specific guidelines” of acceptable 
conduct, choosing instead to rely on “the legal profession’s 
maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law’s presumption 
that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the 
Amendment envisions.”254  In reaching this conclusion, Justice 
O’Connor argued, 
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can 
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by 
defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how 
best to represent a criminal defendant.  Any such set of rules would 
interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of 
counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making 
tactical decisions.255 
Journalism, however, is not an adversarial profession; reporters do 
not make nearly the same kind or magnitude of strategic decisions as 
attorneys.256  Thus, while the Supreme Court cannot practicably 
                                                 
 250. See Geoffery R. Stone, Why We Need a Federal Reporter’s Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 39, 47 (2005) (lambasting the idea of requiring licensing for journalists because 
it would defy more than 200 years of constitutional traditions). 
 251. See SMOLLA, supra note 119, at § 3:30 (cautioning that the practical 
application of defamation liability in several states resembles more of an actual 
malice standard than a negligence standard). 
 252. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 253. See id. at 687-88 (holding that attorney performance must comply with a 
standard of “reasonably effective assistance”). 
 254. Id. at 688. 
 255. Id. at 688-89. 
 256. Moreover, while news organizations may face pressing time constraints with 
some stories, they presumably have substantial leeway to extend deadlines for many 
BARRON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 10/5/2007  7:14:00 PM 
2007] A PROPOSAL TO RESCUE NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN 123 
determine ex ante which conduct constitutes effective assistance of 
counsel, it can prescribe specific procedures that are likely to 
optimize the accuracy of news reports. 
Additionally, the interests underlying the First Amendment require 
the Court to lay down marginally specific guidelines for journalists.  
The Strickland Court’s refusal to establish specific guidelines ensured 
that the right to a fair trial was not overprotected, because ineffective 
assistance in one criminal case may be good strategy in another.257  
The same type of open-ended reasonableness standard, however, 
would impede the First Amendment interest in promoting a 
responsible press by providing little notice regarding what constitutes 
responsible conduct.  Loosening ex ante control over the standard of 
responsible journalism would also risk creating a chilling effect on 
the press by increasing error costs at the pre-trial stage.258 
The proposed standard and Strickland are both apt examples of 
experimentalist regulations, which courts are capable of 
implementing.259  Under an experimentalist system, a primary 
regulatory body creates flexible norms that are then developed and 
refined by lower bodies through continual, transparent negotiation 
with institutional stakeholders.260  Experimentalist systems avoid 
cumbersome, top-down oversight by disbursing regulatory power and 
limiting it with broad goals or guidelines.261  Strickland was unwittingly 
experimentalist:  it created an open standard of attorney 
reasonableness that was then developed by lower courts with 
deference to already-existing professional norms.262  Likewise, as 
                                                 
others.  Unless they can obtain continuances, lawyers are bound by the schedules set 
by courts and thus act under fixed time constraints. 
 257. One might also argue that the lack of specific guidelines serves criminal 
defendants’ interest in a fair trial by failing to restrict the arguments available on 
appeal regarding the unreasonableness of an attorney’s conduct. 
 258. Cf. Barrett, supra note 71, at 858 (viewing the rise in defamation insurance 
premiums and shift of reporters to the legal staff as a result of fear over losing libel 
suits). 
 259. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:  How 
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1021-22 (2004) (highlighting 
the shift away from command-and-control injunctive regulation toward a more 
experimentalist intervention in litigation concerning education, mental health, 
prisons, police, and housing). 
 260. See id. at 1019 (distinguishing command-and-control regulation, which 
requires strong central authority and a comprehensive regime of rules, from 
experimentalist regulation, which is more flexible). 
 261. See id. at 1015, 1061-62 (advocating the experimentalist approach’s ability to 
modify and adapt to new ideas and norms). 
 262. See Ivan K. Fong, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 461, 481 (1987) (critiquing the Court in Strickland for creating two seemingly 
conflicting standards:  one that insists on a fair trial and one that relinquishes 
autonomy to the attorney’s judgment). 
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noted, because the proposed standard of responsible journalism is 
moderately open-ended, journalists will retain substantial control in 
fashioning their own codes of conduct.  That power will be shaped in 
part by the constitutional limits recognized by the Supreme Court 
and with the cooperation and oversight of trial judges at the pre-trial 
stage. 
The proposed standard can therefore be viewed as a limited, 
constitutionally mandated structural reform, and meritorious 
defamation suits are, in this sense, small-scale instances of structural 
reform that partially destabilize media defendants.  The press 
remains substantially shielded from public control under the First 
Amendment, but it is guided by courts toward the adoption of 
professional norms that meet a baseline standard of responsibility.  
Thus, the proposed standard represents a set of performance goals 
for the press—the kind of determination that courts are capable of 
making under experimentalist structural reforms.  For example, the 
standard does not instruct reporters on how to investigate articles, 
but it instead informs them that they must create and adhere to a 
standard that meets a threshold reasonableness requirement. 
As a final matter, it should be noted that the judiciary is the body 
best situated to regulate the press.  Because judges are insulated from 
direct public control and political pressure, they have the least 
incentive to manipulate the press toward their own ends.263  
Additionally, the proposed summary proceeding stems from the 
Constitution and is therefore almost entirely shielded from the 
control of legislative and executive branches at the state and federal 
level.  Even if government officials bring defamation actions against 
the press, judges rendering pre-trial determinations retain ultimate 
control over the checking power on the press. 
2. Will individuals bring defamation actions if there is even less chance of 
receiving financial recovery than under the actual malice standard? 
As noted above, the proposed summary proceeding will prevent 
many reputational injuries from occurring.264  Even after a 
                                                 
 263. Although state judges are often elected and therefore less shielded from 
external influence, their decisions remain reviewable by the Supreme Court, not to 
mention state appellate judges that are less susceptible to public influence. 
 264. For example, the fifth factor asks whether the press reasonably received 
comments from the injured plaintiff, and the sixth factor allows media defendants 
the ability to retract a defamatory statement.  These criteria provide opportunities for 
counterspeech and the chance to reclaim reputation.  See Steven J. Heyman, Righting 
the Balance:  An Inquiry Into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. 
L. REV. 1275, 1360 (1998) (acknowledging that harm to a public official’s reputation 
is not as severe when it comes from good-faith criticism because such criticism 
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reputational harm has occurred, however, the proposed standard of 
responsible journalism affords plaintiffs far greater protection than 
would be available solely under the Sullivan standard.  Because the 
proposal provides media defendants with a strong incentive to retract 
false statements, defamed individuals are likely to bring falsehoods to 
the media’s attention or to threaten litigation.  Inasmuch as people 
prefer repairing their damaged reputations to receiving monetary 
awards, this outcome is a tremendous boon to those harmed by the 
publication of false statements.265 
The availability of an inexpensive and speedy summary proceeding 
will also substantially reduce plaintiffs’ pre-trial litigation costs and 
provide a free glimpse at the editorial procedures underlying the 
publication of alleged falsehoods.  Plaintiffs therefore retain financial 
incentive to bring defamation actions against media defendants at 
least up to the pre-trial stage.  The result of the proposed proceeding 
should be an increase in pre-trial litigation, but a substantial decrease 
in cases that survive it.  Should the defendant lose at the pre-trial 
stage, the plaintiff can then reassess the viability of continuing the 
defamation action.  In that event, the plaintiff may deem his or her 
prospects for success at trial or at receiving a settlement more likely, 
and accordingly may maintain the suit.  Either way, the proposed 
proceeding will allow more plaintiffs to have their day in court, even 
if it does not expand the number of plaintiffs who receive monetary 
awards. 
3. How does the proposal account for the distinction between media and 
non-media defendants? 
Because this Article has focused on the need for a responsible 
press, it has deliberately refrained from discussing the distinction 
between media and non-media defendants.  It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine what entities fall under the rubric “media,” 
especially following the advent of the Internet.266  Yet that distinction 
                                                 
enables self-governance, and because those public officials can engage in 
counterspeech). 
 265. See Randall P. Bezanson et al., The Economics of Libel:  An Empirical Assessment, 
in THE COST OF LIBEL:  ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 22 (Everette E. Dennis & 
Eli M. Noam eds., 1989) (arguing that defamation plaintiffs “are often not motivated 
chiefly by money; that [plaintiffs’] actions are not based on economically rational 
decisions about the prospects of financial recovery in litigation; and that the 
economic calculus that governs negotiation in libel cases has ‘surprisingly little 
relation to the rules of defamation liability’”). 
 266. See, e.g., Perzanowski, supra note 104, at 835, 851–52 (observing that the ease 
and frequency of individual contributions to the marketplace of ideas has allowed 
private citizens to act as both the audience and the source for information regarding 
public figures). 
BARRON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 10/5/2007  7:14:00 PM 
126 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1 
is unnecessary under the proposed summary proceeding.  Given the 
need for an optimized marketplace of ideas and political discourse 
founded on truthful premises, the public is better off if the 
individuals and entities reporting facts are capable of doing so under 
a baseline standard of diligence.  Those who choose to disseminate 
information at the heart of either the marketplace of ideas or of 
political discourse should be capable of checking facts, investigating 
leads and publishing retractions that can reasonably alleviate 
reputational injury. 
Thus, as a normative matter, defamation liability should deter 
individuals incapable of responsibly reporting from publishing 
injurious facts about others.  If the standard of responsible journalism 
is universally applied, people will be more likely to turn damaging 
information over to individuals or entities with access to greater 
investigative resources.267  Holding individuals like bloggers to a 
standard of responsible reporting also increases the likelihood that 
they are certain of the accuracy of the statements they publish and 
that they conduct whatever investigation they can prior to releasing 
harmful information. 
CONCLUSION 
The irony of Sullivan is that the Times would have avoided liability if 
it had satisfied any of the proposed criteria of responsible journalism.  
Editors at the Times could have contacted the signatories of the 
political advertisement, checked the facts with their Alabama reporter 
or against their own articles, or published a timely correction.  Each 
was a cheap and easy option.  The Times employees acted in good 
faith, yet they wantonly brought the litigation upon the newspaper by 
failing to adhere to a baseline standard of professionalism. 
Indeed, the Sullivan standard itself, although fashioned with the 
objective of protecting press speech, needlessly sacrifices the best 
interests of the public, not to mention the reputations of individuals 
harmed by the spread of falsehoods.  Justice White eloquently noted 
this outcome: 
The New York Times rule thus countenances two evils:  first, the 
stream of information about public officials and public affairs is 
polluted and often remains polluted by false information; and 
second, the reputation and professional life of the defeated 
plaintiff may be destroyed by falsehoods that might have been 
                                                 
 267. But see Franklin, supra note 185, at 838 (acknowledging that some determined 
publishers might still disseminate false material in an effort to build audiences). 
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avoided with a reasonable effort to investigate the facts.  In terms of 
the First Amendment and reputational interests at stake, these 
seem grossly perverse results.268 
Justice White recognized that what is at stake in libel suits far exceeds 
the promotion of an abstract, albeit compelling, need for a fearless 
press. 
When the public lacks confidence in the competence of the 
institutional press, it effectively loses the sole independent watchdog 
of public representations.269  People are bombarded with messages 
from interested parties on a daily basis:  government officials hold 
news conferences, organizations issue press releases, and companies 
advertise their products.  During an election campaign, candidates 
air myriad commercials promoting their platforms or lambasting 
opponents.  All of those representations are vital to the functionality 
of the political process and economic market.  Those representations 
cannot achieve either end, however, if the press is inept in overseeing 
them or if there is no external incentive for the press to proficiently 
do so.270  What the Sullivan Court failed to recognize is that it is not 
just a fearless press that is imperative; the public needs, and the First 
Amendment requires, a competent press as well. 
This Article has argued that the tripartite interests in defamation 
suits are not mutually exclusive.  By using litigation costs to induce 
responsible journalism, the Court can encourage practices that at 
once protect plaintiffs’ reputations, shield the press from liability and 
maximize media truth-telling.  The result will be streamlined libel 
litigation and an optimized, independent source of information.  All 
parties that have a stake in efficient and effective libel litigation are 
thus bettered by the proposed summary proceeding, including the 
referents of media speech, the public, the government, and, 
certainly, the press itself. 
 
                                                 
 268. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 769 (1985) 
(White, J., concurring). 
 269. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667-68 
(1990) (recognizing the unique role the press plays in informing and educating 
citizens on matters of public concern); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. 
Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583-84 (1983) (discussing the role of the press in 
contributing to the rise of independence during the Revolution); Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (championing the press as a check against the abuses of 
power by government officials and a means for keeping public officials responsible 
for their actions). 
 270. See supra Part II.A for a full discussion on how the actual malice standard 
promotes sloppy reporting because all a journalist needs to do to avoid liability is 
show his or her state of mind and not the quality of work, and see supra Part II.B for 
a full discussion on how excessive litigation costs unduly tie the hands of the media. 
